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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of Uzbekistan’s counterterrorist policies during the 
period of 1990–2012. It overviews the development of radical Islamism in Uzbekistan 
and evaluates the remaining terrorist threats. The effectiveness of Uzbekistan’s 
counterterrorist policies is mainly analyzed by comparing the strengths and weaknesses 
of the both sides: the radical Islamist, especially terrorist, organizations and the Uzbek 
government. The Uzbek public support—as the main factor determining the effectiveness 
of the counterterrorist policies in the country—is presented within the originally 
constructed framework of many factors that cover not only the government’s encounter 
with the radical Islamists and terrorists but also a wider historic, social, and economic 
situation in Uzbekistan. In addition, Uzbekistan’s international counterterrorist 
cooperation is considered as an important factor for the sustenance of the highly 
repressive regime of President Islam Karimov. Although this thesis is focused on 
terrorism in just one country, the short overview of Islamism in the other Central Asian 
implies the case-specific nature of terrorism in general. This thesis demonstrates that the 
repressive and indiscriminate counterterrorism policies may remain effective in 
Uzbekistan even in the long-term due to the unique historic, economic, and social 
situation in the country and the specific geopolitical situation.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B.  IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................2 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
E.  METHODS AND SOURCES ........................................................................10 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................12 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN UZBEKISTAN (1990 – 
2012) ............................................................................................................................13 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 
B.  DEVELOPMENT AND RADICALIZATION OF ISLAM IN 
UZBEKISTAN ...............................................................................................15 
C.  THREAT OF THE ISLAMIC TERRORISM ............................................18 
1.  Origins and Ideologies .......................................................................18 
2.  Strategies and Developments. ...........................................................23 
3.  Organization and Resources .............................................................28 
4.  Recruitment and Popular Support ...................................................31 
D.  THREAT OF THE NON-VIOLENT ISLAMIC RADICALISM .............34 
1.  Origins and Ideology..........................................................................34 
2.  Strategy and Development ................................................................35 
3.  Organization and Resources .............................................................37 
4.  Recruitment and Popular Support ...................................................38 
E.  CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................39 
III.  COUNTERTERRORIST POLICIES OF UZBEKISTAN  (1990–2012) .............41 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B.  STRATEGY AND LEGISLATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM ........43 
1.  Strategy on Counterterrorism ..........................................................43 
2.  National Legislation Related to Counterterrorism .........................46 
C.  COUNTERTERRORIST ORGANIZATION, RESOURCES, AND 
MEASURES IN UZBEKISTAN ...................................................................52 
1.  Organizational Framework for Counterterrorism .........................52 
2.  Counterterrorism Resources .............................................................54 
3.  Implementation of the Counterterrorism Strategy ........................58 
D.  PUBLIC SUPPORT IN UZBEKISTAN ......................................................63 
1.  Political Situation in Uzbekistan.......................................................63 
2.  Economic and Social Situation in Uzbekistan .................................67 
3.  Analysis of Public Opinion ................................................................71 
E.  CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................77 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE ON UZBEKISTAN’S 
COUNTERTERRORIST POLICIES (1990 – 2012) ..............................................81 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................81 
 viii
B.  UZBEKISTAN’S CT COOPERATION WITH THE CENTRAL 
ASIAN STATES .............................................................................................82 
1.  Uzbekistan’s Approach to the Regional CT Cooperation ..............82 
2.  Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Tajikistan................................83 
3.  Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Kyrgyzstan .............................86 
4.  Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Kazakhstan .............................88 
5.  Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Turkmenistan .........................90 
6.  Commonality of Political and Popular Preferences in Central 
Asia ......................................................................................................91 
C.  WIDER FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON UZBEKISTAN’S CT 
POLICIES ......................................................................................................93 
1.  Official and Popular Uzbek Preferences in International 
Relations..............................................................................................93 
2.  The U.S. Influence on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies .............................96 
3.  The European Influence on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies ...................98 
4.  Russia’s Influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT Policies .......................99 
5.  China’s Influence on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies ............................102 




LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................117 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Number of terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan (1990–2012)..................................14 
Figure 2.  The IMU, IJU, and Akramiyyah’s acts in Central Asia (1998–2012). .............26 
Figure 3.  Framework of the counterterrorism organization. ...........................................54 
Figure 4.  Framework of influence on public opinion on counterterrorism. ....................72 
Figure 5.  Number of terrorist attacks in Tajikistan (1992–2012)....................................84 
Figure 6.  Number of terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan (1992–2012). ................................87 
Figure 7.  Number of terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan (1992–2012). ................................89 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AI – Amnesty International 
APK – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party of Turkey)  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
CIS – Commonwealth Independent States 
COIN – Counter-insurgency 
CSTO – Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization 
CT – counterterrorist 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation 
HRW – Human Rights Watch 
ICG – International Crisis Group 
ICNL – The International Center for Non-for-Profit Law 
IGU – Islamic Jihad Group 
IJU – Islamic Jihad Union 
IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
IRP – Islamic Revival Party 
IRPT – Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan 
ISAF- International Security Assistance Force (NATO forces in Afghanistan). 
IWPR – Institute for War & Peace Reporting 
MB – Muslim Brotherhood 
MMA – Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Front party in Pakistan) 
NGO – non-governmental organization 
NSS – National Security Service (rus. Sluzhba Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti: SNB) 
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
U.S. DoS – U.S. Department of State 
UTO – United Tajik Opposition  
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Maria Rasmussen, whose 
highly professional and encouraging approach helped me to not only develop this thesis 
but also gain deeper understanding about the phenomena of terrorism. I would also like to 
thank Dr. Ryan Gingeras for his insights and support during this period. 
It is difficult for me to overestimate the support and contribution from my family 
that most of the time lived on the other hemisphere and had to cope with daily routine 
and challenges without me. I am very grateful to my wife, Vilhelmina, for her endurance 
and belief in my abilities and my children for being so patient and sensible. 
Finally, I would like to thank the whole faculty and staff of the National Security 
Affairs department for making my studies at Naval Postgraduate School challenging, 
appealing, and valuable.  
 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The collapse of the USSR brought to Uzbekistan and to the other Central Asian 
states not only independence, followed by large socio-economic changes, but also a 
revival of Islam. The traditional moderate Central Asian Islam1 was accompanied also by 
radical interpretations and fundamentalism. The latter came with the various missionaries 
from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. They got support from the 
formerly unofficial local clergy. In the 1990s, all of this provided the context for and 
conditioned the appearance of Islamic terrorism in Uzbekistan. The state considered it as 
the most dangerous threat and suppressed it by force and strict control of religious affairs. 
This made Uzbekistan infamous for harsh repressions, continuous violations of human 
rights, and lack of democracy. Furthermore, the authoritarianism, state-controlled 
economy, and vast corruption caused the overall decline of public welfare. Although such 
policies usually fuel public discontent and, consequently, stronger public support for 
violent opposition, the level of terrorism in Uzbekistan has steadily declined since 1999. 
The main research question of this thesis, therefore, is: could the counterterrorist (CT) 
policies in Uzbekistan be evaluated as effective in the long-term?  
In order to answer such a question, the strengths and weaknesses of both sides—
the radical Islamic organizations2 and the state—have to be evaluated. Public support, a 
major factor in the long-term, needs assessment too. Since contemporary Islamic 
terrorism usually exceeds national borders, the influence of the international environment 
on Uzbekistan’s CT policies must be considered as well. The findings from these three 
parts of analysis will provide the final conclusions. 
                                                 
1. Igor Lipovsky, “The Awakening of Central Asian Islam,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 3 (1996): 
1–9; Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University Press, 
2000), 143–5. 
2. In this paper, expressions such as “Islamic radicalism,” “radical Islamists,” “Islamist movements,” 
“Islamic fundamentalists,” and similar are purposefully used to cover not only Islamic terrorists but also 
other Islamic organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that  rejects violence and in some Western countries 
even enjoys legal status. In Uzbekistan, as any other radical Islamic organization, it is considered a terrorist 
organization and is fully subjected not only to the restrictions on religion but also to the CT policies. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
Due to the harsh nature and broad scope of Uzbekistan’s CT policies, their 
influence on the overall situation in the country and regional security is strong. The 
centrality of Uzbekistan in the region is determined not only by the most developed 
infrastructure and central location, which gives a major role in most of the projects of 
regional development and the NATO’s transit to Afghanistan, but also by the largest 
population and military forces.3 The unresolved border issues, economic disputes, large 
ethnic Uzbek minorities in the neighboring countries, and President Islam Karimov’s 
ambitions for regional dominance make regional relations quite tense. The historic and 
socio-economic similarities make the security of all Central Asian states strongly 
intertwined and influenced Uzbekistan’s ability to counter the threat of Islamic terrorism 
in the long-term. 
Although the steady decrease in terrorist attacks in this country through the last 
eight years implies that Uzbekistan’s CT efforts have been effective, the way these results 
were achieved and the current international developments cause serious concerns for the 
future. Due to the repression of Karimov’s regime, the Islamic terrorists fled to 
Afghanistan and later Pakistan but continue attacking Central Asian states. The latter, 
therefore, gradually emulate Uzbekistan’s CT policies. Uzbekistan is infamous for harsh 
indiscriminate repressions, violations of human rights, widespread corruption, and lack of 
democracy and rule of law. All these problems raise popular discontent and give the 
Islamists more opportunities for recruitment. The U.S.-led coalition’s intent to withdraw 
its forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and the possible return of the Taliban into power 
could increase terrorist activities in Central Asia as well.4 Then, the latest developments 
of political Islamism in Northern Africa and the Middle East may encourage the local 
Islamists for insurgency. The long-term effectiveness of Uzbekistan’s CT policies, 
therefore, becomes crucial for the regional security. 
                                                 
3. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Uzbekistan.” 
4. International Crisis Group (ICG), Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in 
Afghanistan, in Asia Report No.221 (2012): 15. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are a number of problems that make this research difficult: 
 The absence of commonly accepted methods to evaluate the effectiveness 
of CT policies and the absence of reliable statistical data make quantitative 
measurement irrelevant. 
 Due to the incomplete and sometimes even contradicting data from 
various sources it is difficult to draw exhaustive conclusions about the 
actual terrorist activities. Often existing data lacks reliable evidence and 
rests on unjustified suspicions. Also the arbitrary labeling as terrorist of 
the attacks related to the clashes among the various local groups for power 
and economic gains distort the whole picture. 
 Due to the absence of political opposition in Uzbekistan and democratic 
elections it is difficult to evaluate the real popular political preferences. 
 Due to the strict censorship, control of the public media, and limitations on 
the freedom of speech in Uzbekistan, it is difficult to gather reliable 
information about the governmental activities and the public opinion. The 
same foreign agencies held public opinion polls in the other Central Asian 
states as well. Some differences in the results can be explained by the 
differences by some political and ethnic situations. The similarities can be 
attributed to the similar historical background and socio-economic 
challenges. This proves the sufficient reliability of these reports. 
And yet, for the reasons mentioned in the second section, Uzbekistan requires 
evaluation in terms of its effectiveness against Islamic radicalism, especially terrorism, in 
order to determine its ability to manage the remaining threats. Considering the case-
specific nature of the CT campaigns, this thesis presents the argument that repressive CT 
policies are effective in the short-term and the long-term. The empirical evidence from 
many CT campaigns in various countries show that brutal repressions can suppress 
terrorism, but the period till the next wave of terrorism depends on many internal and 
external conditions in the country. Some Muslim countries (e.g. Turkey and Indonesia) 
dealt with Islamism in a peaceful and democratic way after the long periods of 
suppressive anti-Islamic policies. The key strength of Uzbekistan, in that respect, is the 
largely secular post-Soviet society, but the key challenge remains security situation in 
Afghanistan. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a wide range of literature providing a historical background on the 
factors that shaped Uzbek nation’s mentality and perceptions about Islam and the state. 
Olivier Roy describes the impact of Soviet rule on the building of Uzbek nation and the 
independent state building during the first ten years among other nations of Central Asia.5 
The curriculum of public education on the national history still bears a lot of Soviet 
influence and separates this nation from other Muslim nations (e.g. Arabs, Persians, 
Turks).6 According to Vitalyi Naumkin, The atheistic Soviet policy and prevailing 
secular nationalism in the first years of independence determined that Islam primarily 
remained as a means of national identity but not a blueprint for state organization.7 The 
later works confirmed that “Islamist rhetoric exists in Uzbekistan in an inhospitable 
cultural milieu”8  and emphasized that the state’s attempt to suppress Islamism is “the 
most powerful recruiting tool of the Islamists.”9 All these sources also describe the 
development of the national Communist elites during the Soviet period, their role after 
the declaration of independence, and their approach towards religion and terrorism.  
The analysis of Islamic movements in Uzbekistan requires knowledge about their 
ideology, developments, and actions. Mark Juergensmeyer gives comprehensive 
descriptions about the various forms of religious terrorism and the understanding of 
Islamic jihad that provides the ideological foundation of Islamic terrorism around the 
world, and defines five possible scenarios for the state.10  He favors the one that requires 
the state to accept moral and religious values in politics. Considering the nature of the 
                                                 
5. Olivier Roy. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. New York: University Press, 2000. 
6. Shoshana Keller, “Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum,” 
Slavic Review 66, no.2 (2007): 264. 
7. Vitalyi Naumkin, “Islam in the States of the Former USSR,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 524 (1992): 131–142. 
8. Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 35, no. 4 (2003): 590. 
9. Jeremy T. Gunn, “Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism, and the State in Central Asia,” 
Sociology of Religion 64, No.3 (2003): 407. 
10. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
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current state and Ahmed Rashid’s book about militant Islam in Central Asia11, it is 
difficult to expect such an outcome in Uzbekistan. Emmanuel Karagiannis clearly 
demonstrates that the very ideology of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), allegedly the most 
popular banned Islamist organization in Uzbekistan, restricts any compromises with the 
secular state and rejects democracy.12 In addition, he explains why HT abstains from 
violence. But Karagiannis doubts the preference for non-violence can be sustained. 
Although in many Western countries HT is considered a non-violent religious movement 
and is not listed among terrorist organizations in the terrorism databases (e.g. GTD),13 in 
Uzbekistan, it is under the same severe persecution as the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). There is some uncertainty in the 
literature about the IMU’s development during the last few years, the inception of the 
IJU, and their capabilities and intentions.  
In 2003 analyzing the IMU, Naumkin14 doubted this organization could regain 
power in Uzbekistan after substantial losses and emphasized that unification with HT still 
would be unlikely. Rashid15 also considered that the IMU influence on the Uzbek 
population will be very limited. Later that prediction was confirmed by Richard Weitz.16 
His claim, referring to Eurasia.net,17 about the IMU’s unification with the other Islamic 
organizations (including the HT), transformation into the Islamic Movement of Central 
Asia, and later into Jihad Islamic Union was unjustified. This opinion was reasonably 
argued by Rashid in the very same press-release. Einar Wigen also describes the IJU as a 
separate from the IMU organization, which hardly justifies the name of “Turkish al-
                                                 
11. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 
2003). 
12. Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir (London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
13. GTD—Global Terrorism Database. 
14. Vitaly Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan, 
Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, UC Berkeley (2003). 
15. Rashid, Jihad, 243. 
16. Richard Weitz, Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU)? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no.6 (2004): 505–530. 
17. “Central Asia: Are Radical Groups Joining Forces?” Eurasianet, October 10, 2002. 
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Qaida” given by some scholars.18 Both organizations moved into Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, encountering local and NATO forces, and changed their initial focus from 
Central Asia to the much wider international scene through relations with the Haqqani 
Network and al-Qaeda.19 Updates of information about these terrorist organizations can 
be gathered through a wide selection of websites and media portals. However, due to the 
uncertain information,20 it is difficult to assess the exact involvement of the IMU or the 
IJU in the terrorist acts in Uzbekistan. 
While the literature of the previous paragraph also gives some information about 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies, the official national information is very limited. Features of the 
authoritarian and repressive regime of President Islam Karimov can be noticed in the 
cases of other repressive states (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Tunisia, Tajikistan, and 
others) analyzed in Why Muslims Rebel by Mohammed Hafez.21 This book gives 
convincing explanations and empirical evidence about causes of popular discontent and 
terrorism in Muslim societies. These cases will be useful for comparison with 
Uzbekistan’s fight against Islamic terrorism. The harsh peculiarities of “Karimov’s 
war”22 are reflected in many international (e.g. UN, U.S., EU) reports and surveys. Even 
the previously more liberal religious and CT policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tend 
to converge with the more repressive ones of Uzbekistan.23 Martha Olcott24 reasonably  
 
 
                                                 
18. Einar Wigen, Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaida’s Key to the Turkic World? Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment (FFI,2009), 35. 
19. David Witter, Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region, Institute for the Study of War (2011), 
12. Andrew R. Feitt, “Countering the IMU in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (March 11, 2010): 3. 
20. Often several names of suspected perpetrators are provided and sometimes different sources 
provide different information. E.g. the Global Terrorist Database shows 5 attacks in Central Asia in 2004, 
while the other source shows 11 (Thomas  M. Sanderson, Daniel Kimmage, and David A. Gordon, “From 
the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (2010): 27–8).  
21. Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
22. Human Rights First, Karimov’s War: Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism in 
Uzbekistan, by Archana Pyati, ed. Eric Biel, Neil Hicks, and Michael McClintock (2005).   
23. Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
24. Martha B. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 
2005). 
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asserts that the current authoritarian Central Asian regimes create causes for terrorism by 
ignoring the needs of local populations and emphasizes a need for the international 
community to take a regional approach. 
Although academic attempts to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
policies started a few decades ago, this issue still remains challenging and significantly 
unexplored.25 Eric van Um and Daniela Pisoiu provided an excellent overview of the 
academic literature on this issue.26 Due to the lack of clear definition on the effectiveness 
of counterterrorism, they categorized all studies in accordance to their orientation to 
output-effectiveness, outcome-effectiveness, or impact-effectiveness.27 Most of the 
literature is focused on the impact-effectiveness and based on quantitative methodologies 
providing the most understandable and convincing answers expressed in concrete figures 
(e.g., numbers of terrorist attacks, fatalities and material damage, arrested or killed 
terrorists). Although generally desired by national leadership and general public, figures 
provide limited and conditional information and sometimes are even deceptive.28 The 
figures and their trends in itself do not provide sufficient information about the reasons 
for change in terrorist activity, its impact on society, and the complexity of the very 
phenomenon of terrorism (psychological, social, economic, cultural, etc.),29 the 
application of business-like statistical methodologies is questionable, because terrorist 
attacks are relatively rare (in comparison, for example, with numbers of shoppers in 
groceries) and “there are no meaningful patterns that show what behavior indicates 
planning or preparation for terrorism.”30 
                                                 
25. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Combating Terrorism: The 
Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness,” by Raphael Perl, CRS Report RL33160, March 12, 2007, 2. 
26. Eric van Um and Daniela Pisoiu, Effective counterterrorism: What have we learned so far? 
Economics of Security Working Paper 55 (2011): 3–4. 
27. This conceptualization of effectiveness was developed by professor Oran R. Young, Bren School 
of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
28. Daniel Byman, “Measuring the War on Terrorism: A First Appraisal,” Current History 102, 
No.668 (2003): 411; Jeff Jonas and Jim Harper, “Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of 
Predictive Data Mining,” Policy Analysis No.584, CATO Institute (2006). 
29. Teun van Dongen, Break it Down: An Alternative Approach to Measuring Effectiveness in 
Counterterrorism, Economics of Security Working Paper 23 (2009), 2–11; CRS, Combating, 5–9. 
30. Jonas and Harper, “Effective,” 7–8. 
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In order to determine how specific interventions influenced the outcomes or 
impact on terrorist activities, a well-structured and articulated CT strategy and programs 
with clearly defined goals, tasks, and indicators integrated into causality chains must be 
developed. Due to the general lack of comprehensively described CT policies, the 
quantitative methodologies are applied just to monitor the impacts of separate, one-type 
interventions and are tailored to specific contexts in those countries.31 Despite such 
complex and costly efforts, the influence from other governmental programs and the 
unexpected consequences of policy remain largely unknown.32 The most desirable 
impact—no terrorist attacks—is still shared by all governments. However, this raises a 
problem of “measuring the negative”33 or the probability of the next attack. All those 
deficiencies seriously limit the application of quantitative methods, especially where the 
amount of data is too small for statistical analysis, dubious, or kept secret. 
Considering the authoritarian nature of the political regime and the strict 
censorship of public information in Uzbekistan, the application of quantitative methods 
could be quite limited due to the lack of available data and questions about the reliability 
of data. The pressure to evaluate effectiveness of CT policies comes from democratic 
governments that are accountable for expenditures and respective progress. The 
authoritarian regime of Uzbekistan, most probably, does not have such a need. Its CT 
policy is not even publicized, except in a chapter in the Karimov’s book34 and in the 
respective legislation.  
                                                 
31. Targeted killings in Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 116–24; Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman, “Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using StockMarket Data,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 20, No. 2 (2006): 193–206; Ceasefires, unemployment rates, and price indexes in Christopher 
Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-terrorist Policies (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 38–46.  
32. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), Colloquium on Measuring Effectiveness 
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There is a wide agreement in the literature about the importance of public 
support35 for the state and terrorists. Available studies of public opinion performed by 
international organizations36 in Uzbekistan allow us to assess the level of support for the 
state’s actions, threat perceptions, and religious preferences. The inordinately optimistic 
results provided by the national agency,37 however, raise some suspicion about their 
objectivity. The very nature of public opinion and its interpretation, especially in 
countries so censored as Uzbekistan, make this data more useful for qualitative methods.  
Many scholars and practitioners see more value in qualitative methods or mix of 
both.38 In practice, however, “most studies deal with individual measures only or with a 
convenient selection thereof”39 instead of considering the whole range of state CT and 
related activities in order to assess the overall outcome- or impact-effectiveness. The 
evaluation of the latter usually is related to the dynamics of terrorist activities. The 
evaluation of the former is more complicated and requires assessment of indicators 
related to capabilities and success factors on both sides: terrorist organizations and state. 
Indicators like the ability to gather intelligence, the availability of technology, the impact 
on society, the alliances with other terrorist organizations, and others allow assessing 
“how close terrorists are to the next quantum jump.”40  
There is variety of different approaches to analyze the strengths and weaknesses 
of terrorist organizations and states. Crenshaw emphasizes the importance of 
organizational and instrumental approaches in evaluating the potential of terrorist 
organizations.41 The most common indicators of the strength of terrorist organizations are 
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their ability to recruit new members and spread ideology, the availability of weapons and 
financial resources, and the effectiveness of communication networks and leadership. For 
the state’s effectiveness, Daniel Byman suggests to assess organization, intelligence, 
support, and defense.42 While Isabelle Duyvesten seriously questions the utility of 
military forces against terrorism,43 Maria Rasmussen defines the main inefficiencies by 
analyzing practical applications of military forces against civilian riots and terrorism.44  
On the basis of seven CT case studies, Bruce Hoffman and Jeniffer Morrison-Taw offer a 
strategic framework consisting of four crucial elements: effective command and 
coordination structure, wide range of measures “legitimizing” the state’s CT actions, 
coordination within and between intelligence agencies, and international cooperation.45 
They provide a well-supported argumentation for the applicability of that framework in 
other countries, adjusted according to specific circumstances46, and for the value of 
comparative studies. In summary, the effectiveness of the CT policies in Uzbekistan 
could be evaluated by applying mainly qualitative methods and comparisons with similar 
cases as suggested by the scholars above. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Due to the lack of common methodology to measure the effectiveness of the CT 
policies, this thesis will combine several basic analytic methods. The shortage of reliable 
statistical data about the terrorist capabilities and the activities of Uzbekistan’s security 
organizations require wide application of qualitative methods. The number of terrorist 
attacks is just one indicator and does not show the real reasons behind the decline and the 
remaining terrorist threats. The numbers of attacks or attempts and their frequency, the 
numbers of fatalities and injuries, the numbers of active terrorists and supporters, and the 
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numbers of imprisoned Islamists partially allows to determine the current potential of the 
terrorist organizations. The same data also gives some indications about the intensity and 
success of the governmental actions, information about which otherwise is very limited. 
The qualitative evaluation of the radical Islamic organizations will be done by analyzing 
their ideological appeal, the applicability of their strategy, the political impact from their 
attacks, the level of morale, the organizational features, the ethnic composition, the 
availability of safe havens, the access to resources, the possession of sophisticated 
equipment, and the relations with the population. In addition, the comparison with other 
radical Islamic organizations (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (AKP)) that achieved significant political successes in their countries will finalize 
the possibilities for the Uzbek Islamists to threaten security in Uzbekistan in the future.  
The ultimate goal in every fight between states and terrorists is to gain wide 
popular support.47 Hence, the case-specific combination of few quantitative and mostly 
qualitative evaluations will guide the analysis of the popular support. Radical Islamists 
exploit state’s failures in every area of public life by presenting alternative ideologies and 
attempting to mobilize massive insurgency. Demonstrating resolve and developing ability 
to attack the state, they recruit new members utilizing popular grievances and feelings of 
relative deprivation and accumulate resources. Hence, this thesis also considers the nature 
of political regime and its socio-economic policies that correlate with the CT policies and 
significantly influence general public support to the official leadership. Finally, the 
available reports on the public opinion, will give a basis to determine the public 
perception about the legitimacy of and corresponding support to the state’s CT policies. 
The analysis of the international environment in respect to Uzbekistan’s security 
and CT policies is another major factor determining Uzbekistan’s ability to contain 
Islamic terrorism with the current CT policies in the future. The overview of 
Uzbekistan’s relations, from the national security perspective, with its closest neighbors 
and major foreign powers in the region will show their influence on Uzbekistan’s CT 
policies. Due to some important commonalities in the current Uzbek domestic situation 
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with the other Muslim countries, the additional analysis will examine possibilities for 
Uzbekistan to follow the Arab Spring scenario or peaceful developments of the political 
Islamism in other Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan. 
The main sources of information are secondary sources: books and articles. The 
primary sources consist of the published data, legislation, interviews, surveys, and 
reports. The web-based media was monitored until November 14, 2012. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of five chapters, three of which present the main areas of 
analysis for Uzbekistan: development and current potential of the Islamic terrorism; CT 
policies, their implementation, and related public support; and international CT 
cooperation. The first, after the introduction, chapter gives a historical overview of Islam 
in Uzbekistan with the main emphasis on the Soviet period, the development of the 
Islamic fundamentalist movements, and their encounters with the government. Then four 
radical Islamic organizations—IMU, IJU, Akramiyyah, and HT—are analyzed for their 
potential to threaten security in Uzbekistan. The next chapter addresses Uzbekistan’s CT 
policies, the CT organization and resources of the state, and the actual implementation of 
these policies. The short overviews of the political, economic, and social conditions in the 
country are presented in order to analyze Uzbek public support. The international 
influence on Uzbekistan’s CT policies is analyzed in the fourth chapter. Uzbekistan’s 
cooperation is divided into two parts: relations with the Central Asian states, which 
experience similar threats, and with the foreign powers that are the most active in this 
region. This chapter also analyses the possible emulation in Uzbekistan of the Arab 
Spring scenarios or peaceful achievements of the political Islamism in Turkey and 
Pakistan. The fifth chapter concludes on the effectiveness of the CT policies in 
Uzbekistan by using findings from the previous chapters.  
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN 
UZBEKISTAN (1990 – 2012) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 brought Uzbekistan not only to the arena of 
international relations but also back into the world of Islam. The new Muslim nation with 
the population close to 26 million raised hopes and fears worldwide. The Middle East and 
South Asian Muslims hoped that the revival of Islam will integrate Uzbekistan into their 
community. The West feared that the spurious religious revival, under the influence of 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Arab countries, could lead Uzbekistan into a radical 
opposition to the non-Muslim world.48 Currently, Uzbekistan is neither an Islamic state 
nor a liberal democracy either. Although majority of the local population perceive Islam 
in “profoundly secular”49 ways, the strongest radical Islamic organizations in the 
region—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Central Asian branch of the 
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation; HT)—originated in Uzbekistan. 
President Islam Karimov considers Islamic fundamentalism as the most serious threat to 
the national stability and security.50 Uzbekistan is infamous not only for its repressive and 
indiscriminate CT policies but also for the lack of democracy, absence of liberal 
economic reforms, constrains on religion, and continuous violations of human rights. Its 
regime justifies such policies by referring to the persistent threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the experience of the Tajik civil war of 1992 - 1997.51 
The intensity of terrorist activities, however, has no impact on the nature of the 
Uzbek CT policies. The number of terrorist attacks even in the early 1990s was quite low 
to justify so strict CT policies. Furthermore, despite the clearly decreasing numbers of 
terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan during the last eight years (Fig. 1), there are no signs of 
less suppressive measures or more flexible attitude towards Islamic organizations. In 
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addition, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan inflicted major losses on the Taliban and al 
Qaeda that were the main supporters of Uzbek terrorists. On the contrary to such 
developments, since 1999 the CT policies only became more harsh and indiscriminate. 
Still, the regional security situation is not yet stable. The purpose of this chapter, hence, is 
to evaluate the actual threat of the Islamic radicalism to this country.  
 
Figure 1.   Number of terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan (1990–2012).52  
The evaluation of the latter threat requires analysis of the reasons for the Islamic 
radicalization in Uzbekistan and the radical Islamic organizations themselves. Firstly, a 
history of Islam in Uzbekistan will present not only the roots of the Islamic radicalism 
and terrorism but also what shaped the current relation between Islam and the modern 
Uzbek society. The majority of the analysis of the terrorist Islamic organizations is 
allocated to the IMU. The main reasons for such an imbalance are: the IMU went through 
the longest and the most dynamic development; the IMU remains the major terrorist 
organization in the region; consequently, the amount of information about its activities is 
also the largest one; since, the IJU in many respects emulated the IMU, it is not necessary 
to provide detailed description on every aspect of the IJU; the short-lived Akramiyyah 
mostly remained invisible and did not leave significant trace. Although the non-violent 
Uzbek HT is also highly secret, its activities become indirectly visible through the large 
governmental campaign against this organization. Since this organization is only a branch 
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of the mature international HT, there is enough literature about its ideology, strategy, and 
developments. In order to emphasize an important distinction between the terrorist 
organizations and the non-violent HT, they are analyzed in the separate sections. 
B. DEVELOPMENT AND RADICALIZATION OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN 
After the Soviet period for the majority of Uzbeks Islam became just a matter of 
national identity and traditions; however, Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana Valley 
ignited Islamic radicalism and terrorism. The moderate Sunni ideology and Hanafi school 
of Islamic law dominated in Central Asia for centuries. The influence from India through 
religious studies and literature kept the local Islam apart from the more fundamentalist 
Arab Islam53 and balanced fundamentalism preached by the official ulema (religious 
scholars).54 They themselves were influenced by Sufism practiced by the unofficial tribal 
Sufis.55 The latter enjoyed wide popular trust and support, because their asceticism, 
mysticism, pre-Islamic beliefs, and rituals were attractive for the local population due to 
the flexible application of Islam in everyday life.56 
The role of the unofficial clergy grew further during the Soviet period when 
religion was suppressed by the atheistic ideology. The brutal executions, repressions, and 
physical destruction inflicted enormous losses on the local Islam that became isolated and 
stagnate. The old religious literature became unreadable due to the orthographic 
revolutions.57 In parallel, the Cultural Revolution and Russification through several 
generations created a new Soviet Uzbek nation. The public education was atheistic and 
oriented towards the Russian and European cultures.58 The remaining unofficial clergy 
represented “the lowest stratum of the clergy who were ignorant of the canons of classical 
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Islam but well versed in the aspirations and needs of the simple folk.”59 They preached 
Islam secretly, mainly in rural areas, and integrated a number of pre-Islamic beliefs and 
rituals into the national traditions and festivities. These events often were celebrated with 
alcohol and songs, gradually also involved high national officials, and became a public 
secret from the late 1960s.60 Islam became more of an issue of national identity61 and 
resistance to Sovietization than a religious commitment. The majority of Uzbeks got used 
to practice a simplified version of Islam separately from the otherwise secular public life. 
The Soviet manipulation with Islam for own political goals created opportunities 
for Islamic fundamentalism. In 1930s Stalin eliminated the most intellectual and modern 
Islamic movement of Jadids that opposed orthodox ulema and backed the Communist 
ideology.62 The Second World War brought a period of religious tolerance when Soviets 
needed to bolster people’s morale. They allowed the establishment of the Muslim 
Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, opening of few mosques, and 
having some contacts with the Muslim world.63 The Communist party and KGB, 
however, closely controlled religious activities and in the late 1950s suppressed them 
again.64 From the mid-1960s, a new period of tolerance started due to the Soviet 
cooperation with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and other Muslim countries. From the late 
1970s, Islam spread intensively due to the deepening crisis of the Communist ideology, 
influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and war in Afghanistan.65 The attempts of the 
foreign (U.S., UK, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) secret services to spread this war into the 
USSR exposed Uzbeks to the Deobandi-Taliban influence and militant Islam.66 Soviets 
feared proliferation of Islamic traditions and ceremonies and started supporting religious 
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activists who opposed traditionalism; however, the latter were cultivating Wahhabi 
fundamentalism.67 Such ignorant Soviet efforts “did irreparable damage to the local 
forms of Islam, which have always been a natural counterbalance to fundamentalism.”68 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost unleashed forces of nationalism and 
liberalization that created favorable conditions for further development of 
fundamentalism in Uzbekistan. The Salafi ideas about restoration of medieval Caliphate 
existed among the pious Uzbeks for centuries. The unofficial Salafi clergy was 
influenced by Wahhabi ideology from Saudi Arabia. The ignorant Soviet struggle against 
the traditionalist Islam allowed proliferation of the foreign extremist religious literature, 
such as “Muslim Brotherhood” and works of Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu-l-
’Al’a Mawdudi.69 In the late 1970s, the fundamentalist trend divided the unofficial clergy 
into two wings. The most radical fundamentalists separated from the traditionally 
moderate wing. The prominent Salafi ulema Muhammadjon Hindustoni broadly named 
the former as Wahhabis70 due to their ultra-conservative orientation. From the late 1980s, 
the most dynamic development of the secret fundamentalist groups, activities of foreign 
Muslim organizations, and public revival of Islam appeared in the Fergana Valley. The 
high density of population supported intensive social and religious communication that 
contributed to the traditional religious life style and strong resistance to the Soviet 
ideology in this area.71 In the early 1990s, Salafi activists established religious 
organizations like the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) of Uzbekistan, Islam Lashkarlari, 
Tavba, and Adolat. In Fergana, the latter organized local militia, suppressed criminals, 
imposed Sharia laws on the society, and together with the IRP, Birlik, and Erk,72 in 1992, 
demanded President Islam Karimov to declare an Islamic state in Uzbekistan.73  
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This challenge, however, was met with the harsh repressions that pushed the 
Islamic radicals towards the armed resistance and terrorism. Karimov launched a Soviet 
style assault by arresting these activists, expelling foreign missionaries, and banning 
religious parties and groups. He eliminated even the slightest opportunities for opposition 
in the future by a number of laws restricting religious and political activities, empowering 
the law enforcement and military, controlling the national media, and neglecting human 
rights. While most of the Islamic groups disappeared, the remaining ones plunged 
underground and struggled for survival. The militant radicals fled to Tajikistan and joined 
the local Islamic opposition in the following civil war. Having no other way to promote 
their ideology and political goals, they resorted to the armed resistance and terrorism. 
C. THREAT OF THE ISLAMIC TERRORISM 
1. Origins and Ideologies 
Three radical Islamic organizations—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and the Akramiyyah—resorted to terrorism against 
Karimov’s regime. The analysis of their origins and ideologies, strategies and 
developments, organization and resources, and recruitment and popular support will 
determine their potential to threaten Uzbekistan’s security. All three organizations 
originated differently but pursued the same ultimate goal to establish an Islamic state in 
Uzbekistan. Although their ideologies are very similar in terms of calling all Muslims for 
jihad against the corrupt and infidel Uzbekistan’s regime, their scope varies from the 
local and gradual struggle in Uzbekistan till global jihad.  
The IMU originated from the Adolat, hardened during the Tajik civil war, and 
was established in Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In 1989, 
Abduhakim Sattimov established the Adolat as a voluntary group to provide protection 
for the local entrepreneurs against racketeers and patroll cities at night.74 Tahir Yuldashev 
joined this organization and became its ideologist when the Adolat took religious 
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orientation and was renamed into the Islam Lashkarlari.75 It was one of the first Islamic 
militant organizations that “had no respect for official Islam, no patience with tradition, 
and no fear of the political regime.”76 Although initially this organization enjoyed 
popular support and expected quick victory over the weak secular state, it was not able to 
mobilize popular insurgency against Karimov. In 1992, it was defeated by the 
governmental repressions. The remaining militants fled to Tajikistan and joined the local 
IRP in the civil war. In 1997, the end of this war caused dispersion of the Uzbek militant 
group. The main nucleus, headed by Juma Namangani (originally Jumaboi Khojaev), 
settled in Hoit, run small business, and resorted to drug trafficking.77 Due to the anti-
Islamist purge in Uzbekistan, many Uzbek Islamists fled to Namangani asking for a 
refuge and pleading to fight Karimov’s regime. The increasing number of Namangani’s 
followers and Yuldashev’s relations with the Taliban and al Qaeda determined the 
decision of both leaders to establish the IMU in 1998.78 
The IJU originated in 2002 in Pakistan by seceding from the IMU. The reason for 
it was the declining IMU’s focus on Uzbekistan. On the contrary, the IJU, led by 
Nadzhmiddin Jalolov and Suhail Buranov, was determined to concentrate its activities on 
Uzbekistan and preferred affiliation with the al Qaeda instead of the Taliban.79 Initially 
the new organization was named the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), but in 2005 it was 
renamed into the Islamic Jihad Union. The Akramiyyah was founded in 1996 in Andijan 
by a former HT member Akram Yuldashev who organized a network of the local 
entrepreneurs and loyal employees. The initial goal was to study Islam, support each 
other, and the local society. Later, he tried to modify the HT’s methods, originated in 
Arab countries, in order to fit the local mentality and conditions for religious struggle.80  
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The initially simplistic IMU’s ideology, based on the struggle to establish Islamic 
state in Uzbekistan and fight against infidels, matured during the last decade and 
broadened its focus. In 1999, the goal to establish Islamic state and sharia law, as the 
only acceptable regime to Muslims, was clearly stated in “The Call to Jihad by the 
IMU.”81 In the same letter, the IMU warned Uzbek government and Karimov to stop 
repressions and yield power to the Islamic radicals. The call to kill all infidels, Russians, 
Jews, and Americans also dominated the IMU’s ideology. The main feature of the 
latter—the exaltation of the lesser jihad (fight against unbelievers) and neglect of the 
greater jihad (inner spiritual struggle for perfection)—was influenced by the culture of 
violence among the IMU members.82 Their hostility towards the popular traditionalist 
Islam, according to Abduwali qori, made them ghuraba (outcasts) among the Central 
Asian Muslims.83 The militants, however, considered such alienation as a sign of the 
higher status in comparison to the “meek as sheep”84 populace that must be guided by 
them. The “Lessons of Jihad”85 taught new members a perverse worldview that 
strengthened their hatred and will to fight. The scarce education and absence of political 
experience of Tahir Yuldashev, the political leader of the IMU, and the violent nature86 of 
Juma Namangani, the military leader of the IMU, explain such a simplistic approach.  
The initial IMU’s focus on Uzbekistan was broadened with the Salafi ideology of 
global jihad due to the close relations with the Taliban and later with the al Qaeda. In 
return, the IMU got access to the propaganda resources of the latter.87  Zubayar ibn Abdul 
Raheem, possibly an ethnic Uzbek from the Arab Wahhabis, became the religious leader 
of the IMU and in 1999 signed the declaration of jihad against the governments of 
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Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.88 The current IMU’s propaganda is versatile and 
sophisticated.89 The utilization of foreign languages, especially German, is an attempt to 
emulate the IJU’s success of recruitment abroad.90 Furthermore, the ulema council 
developed the religious part of the IMU’s ideology, justified jihad and self-victimization, 
and gave lessons to new members, many of whom later became shahids (martyrs).91 
Nevertheless, in 2006 Tahir Yuldashev addressed Uzbek nation and strongly criticized 
the IJU for its suicide bombings and the HT for its peaceful ideology as unacceptable to 
Uzbek nation.92 However, his own speech, released in January 2010, shows the repellent 
utopia of the IMU’s ideology and its remoteness from Uzbekistan population’s interests: 
 “Our target is not just to conquer Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, but also 
the entire world. [The enemies of Islam] have partitioned the world: this is 
for China, this belongs to Russia, and this part is of the U.S., but as far as 
we are concerned, we don’t recognize those boundaries, we are doing 
jihad and for us there are no boundaries.”93 
Despite the disagreements in the focus on Uzbekistan, the IJU’s ideology is 
analogous to the IMU’s one. The IJU from the very beginning embraced the al Qaeda’s 
ideology of global jihad and utilized its ideological resources. The strong intention to 
keep focus on Uzbekistan, however, was compromised due to the unsuccessful attacks in 
this country in 2004. Furthermore, the continuous fighting against the U.S.-led coalition 
in Afghanistan and regional confrontation in Pakistan inevitably led the IJU towards the 
closer cooperation also with the Taliban. The strong emphasis on the Turkish language in 
the IJU’s propaganda indicates its orientation towards the Turkic speaking populations 
(mainly in Turkey, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Germany) and the Western European 
languages since “the West plays much greater role in its [IJU’s] imagery than it does in 
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IMU’s.”94 In order to create a better image in the West, the IJU even denied its affiliation 
with the al Qaeda.95 While such ideology helped recruiting in the West, its remoteness 
from the Uzbekistan’s realities makes it largely alien to the Uzbek population.  
The Akramiyyah’s ideology differed from the IMU/IJU’s ideologies not only due 
to its gradual and less offensive approach but also due to its very limited proliferation. 
First of all, Akramiyyah’s ideology was based on the non-violent HT ideology that Akram 
Yuldashev tried to modify for Uzbekistan. He laid a gradual development for the local 
Muslims through the stages of suffering and spiritual development to become conscious, 
to unite, and rise against the unjust and infidel regime.96 Secondly, the armed fight in his 
essay and the letter97 were not expressed openly, as in the IMU/IJU’s literature. 
Nevertheless, the inevitable outcome of such ideology is “jihad in its absolute militaristic 
meaning.”98 Akramiyyah’s propaganda did not utilize modern media instruments and 
mainly circulated within the organization. The local population even doubted the very 
existence of such organization and ideology and resented over the law enforcement 
repressions against the respected and decent people as if they were Wahhabis or members 
of the HT.99 The latter, it seems, had a negative image in the eyes of the local population. 
Although Akramiyahh’s social activities earned popular respect to its members, its 
Islamist ideology had no obvious association with this in the eyes of ordinary people. 
Despite a variety of media instruments and several languages, the impact from the 
IMU/IJU’s ideologies on Uzbekistan’s population remains highly dubious. The lack of 
democratic or liberal media and literature in Uzbekistan potentially makes the Islamic 
propaganda more attractive as the only alternative to Karimov’s regime. However, the 
very ideology of global jihad seems hardly appealing to the rather secular Uzbekistan’s 
population. The real impact of this ideology on the public opinion in Uzbekistan and 
Central Asia will be analyzed in the next chapters. 
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2. Strategies and Developments. 
The strategies of the IMU and the IJU evolved in response to the actual 
developments and external conditions, while the Akramiyyah stuck to its initial strategy. 
Deviation from the initial direction allowed the former two organizations to survive and 
even strengthen. Although the Akramiyyah’s strategy was closely linked with the local 
population, the decisive governmental crackdown after the insurgency of 2005 put an end 
to this organization. The militaristic strategy of the IMU evolved during the Tajik civil 
war and hardened in Afghanistan. The initial Adolat’s activities in Fergana Valley were 
similar to the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, which also provided 
protection and social services to the locals in order to gain their support for the future 
struggle. However, the use of force against the non-compliant people and the local 
prosecutors indicated violent nature of the Adolat.100 The later fighting and criminal 
activities101 in Tajikistan made its strategy even more violent. The “Lessons of Jihad” 
teach the strategy of guerrilla warfare that through diversions, killings, and propaganda 
will cripple the economy, scare all foreigners, and gradually destroy the secular state.102 
These lessons teach tactics but also explain how to manipulate the local population, treat 
foreigners and captives, and become fearless warriors.103 The “Lessons of Jihad” refer to 
Islam only as much as it is necessary to ignite hatred and will to fight. The simplistic 
religious content does not provide any deeper knowledge for the fighters that are 
supposed to impose Islamic rule by force.  
The close ties with the Taliban and al Qaeda further hardened the coercive nature 
of the IMU’s strategy and changed its focus from Uzbekistan into global jihad. The cross 
border operations during 1998–2000 from safe refuge in Afghanistan proved to be an 
effective strategy of inciting conflicts between Uzbekistan and its neighbors104 and made 
the IMU’s presence in the country visible. However, due to the “growing pressure from 
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Afghan and NATO counterterrorism forces,”105 the IMU could not focus only on 
Uzbekistan and had to shift its strategy towards the common goals of the Taliban and al 
Qaeda. Currently, the IMU hopes “that foreign troops will indeed leave Afghanistan after 
2014, and the Afghan government will be unable to crush the IMU, or be willing to take a 
payoff to tolerate Central Asian terrorists in their midst.”106 
Despite the similar struggle for survival in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IJU 
partially kept its focus on Uzbekistan. Although the IJU kept launching terrorist attacks in 
Uzbekistan, it also suffered disproportionally high losses. Facing the imminent threat 
from the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan in 2005, it “had to rethink its strategy of 
‘Uzbekistan first.’”107 From 2007, the IJU fully accepted the Taliban’s and al Qaeda’s 
priorities that meant fighting for survival in Afghanistan and wait for the NATO’s 
withdrawal. As a result, the IJU’s strategy naturally converged with the IMU’s and made 
their cooperation more acceptable for both. 
The Akramiyyah’s strategy differed from the IMU’s and IJU’s strategies due to its 
gradualist approach and underground existence in Uzbekistan. Mirroring the HT’s 
ideology, the Akramiyyah had five stages of organization, accumulation of resources, 
spiritual development, spread of influence, and the “‘genuine Islamization’ of society and 
‘natural transition’ of power to the leaders of the group.”108 In terms of practical 
activities, this organization was in between the first and second stages, which were 
invisible to the local population and were far from reaching significant results. The 
strategic goal was an establishment of a new Islamic state by joining parts of the three 
countries around the Fergana Valley,109 but armed fighting was omitted and transition to 
the next stages were unclear. The further development of this strategy was interrupted by 
the arrest of Akram Yuldashev in 1999. The armed insurgency on May 12–13, 2005, 
although carefully organized, was a rather desperate attempt to resist the law enforcement 
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but not an implementation of the above-described strategy. Such a sporadic deviation 
from the strategy was fatal for the very existence of the Akramiyyah that was not ready to 
challenge Karimov’s regime even locally. 
Despite heavy losses, the IMU remains a major terroristic organization in the 
region and is mainly focused on jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After a very active 
initial period, the IMU struggled for survival but with the help from other terrorist 
organizations survived and even expanded its operations. In 1999–2000, the IMU 
launched a number of guerilla raids to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from its bases in 
Tajikistan causing major concerns for the local and foreign governments. The Tashkent 
bombings in 1999, allegedly an attempt to kill President Karimov, were the most 
significant attacks and induced a storm of governmental repressions. The IMU’s drug 
trafficking and kidnappings further deteriorated the regional security. Finally, the Central 
Asian states and Russia with the joint military operations expelled the IMU to 
Afghanistan in January 2001. The IMU joined the Taliban in the fight against the 
Northern Alliance but also continued raids to Uzbekistan from the safe refuge. From 
2001, however, the heavy losses and the death of Namangani inflicted by the U.S.-led 
coalition pushed the IMU to Pakistan.110 As a result, the IMU’s activities in Uzbekistan 
practically stopped. Only in 2010–2011 this organization claimed responsibility for 
attacks in Tajikistan and allegedly expanded activities into Russia.111 The total number of 
the IMU’s attacks and inflicted casualties in Uzbekistan remains low and, except for the 
Tashkent bombings, look more like criminal clashes with the law enforcement. 
Around 2002, the influx of foreign recruits and the internal disagreements about 
the focus on Uzbekistan divided the IMU and resulted in the creation of the IJU.112 The 
recovery period (2002–2004) in South Waziristan was short and followed by continuous 
fighting with Pakistan’s forces and hostile tribes. By 2007, the IMU “appeared a spent 
force, facing hostility of local tribesmen”113 and part of it moved to the Northern 
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Afghanistan. In 2009, another part moved to North Waziristan.114 The death of Tahir 
Yuldashev in 2009115 was among the biggest losses in Afghanistan. Due to the 
questionable identification of killed or captured terrorists by the ISAF and arbitrary 
accusations by the Central Asian authorities,116 it is difficult to evaluate the exact harm 
on the IMU from many ISAF operations.117 Nevertheless, due to the alliances with the 
Taliban, Pakistani Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP), Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda, it is still 
active in Afghanistan and Pakistan.118 In terms of terrorist attacks, the IMU’s activities 
were quite limited (Fig. 2), mostly to Tajikistan, and inflicted losses equal to the victims’. 
 
Figure 2.   The IMU, IJU, and Akramiyyah’s119 acts in Central Asia (1998–2012).120  
The unsuccessful IJU’s attempts to keep focus on Uzbekistan ended up in fighting 
for survival in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2004, the first IJU’s attacks in Uzbekistan 
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ended the five-year break after the Tashkent bombings and for the first time used suicide 
bombers. In 2005, the IJU together with the Akramiyyah took active part in the events of 
May 12–13, 2005 in Andijan. The IJU’s bombings in Tashkent on May 13, most 
probably, were organized in coordination with the insurgency in Andijan. These events 
raised strong reactions not only in Central Asia but on the international scale as well. 
Despite long preparations, these operations were executed poorly and inflicted more 
losses to the IJU than to the attacked side.121 Due to the ongoing fighting against the 
U.S.-led coalition, the number of the IJU’s attacks outside Afghanistan stayed low (Fig. 
2) during the last decade. In 2007, its operation in Germany also failed122 and the IJU had 
to limit its international ambitions. The IJU preferred to “bec[a]me the junior partner in 
an alliance with the Haqqani network (a fundamentally autonomous wing of the Afghan 
Taliban […]) and al Qaida.”123  
The exact involvement of the IJU or the IMU in the terrorist acts during the 
period of 2009–2010 is difficult to define. The Central Asian authorities could blame 
terrorism to hide the organized crime’s (e.g., drug and human trafficking, smuggling) 
fighting against the law enforcement. In addition, both terrorist organizations competed 
for popularity by claiming responsibility for these attacks. Still, the future of both 
organizations largely depends on the fight against the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. 
The brief and initially invisible Akramiyyah’s development culminated in the 
significant armed insurgency that, it seems, ended the existence of this organization. 
Until 2005, there was no information about the Akramiyyah’s activities. In 2004–2005, in 
aspiration to free imprisoned Akram Yuldashev and 23 other businessmen, this 
organization started military training in Osh (Kyrgyzstan). The joint planning with and 
funds from the Akramiyyah’s cells, the IJU, and Chechen militants in Russia,124 the  
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financing from the IMU,125 and the simultaneous IJU’s bombing attempt in Tashkent126 
indicate a broader scope of operations than they actually executed in Andijan on May 13, 
2005. Such relations show that ideological and strategic differences do not preclude 
cooperation among the extremist organizations against the common enemy—Karimov’s 
regime. The following brutal repressions fully destroyed the Akramiyyah and caused 
flows of refugees from Uzbekistan. 
Despite the turbulent developments and heavy losses, two out of the three Islamic 
terrorist organizations survived due to the close relations with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and 
some other terrorist organizations. The lack of reliable information precludes from 
defining the exact involvements of the IMU and the IJU in Uzbekistan or other Central 
Asian states. Currently their activities are focused on operations in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The resulting convergence of their ideologies and the heavy losses may bring 
these two organizations to the closer cooperation. The actual capabilities and intentions 
of the IMU and the IJU to terrorize Uzbekistan, therefore, depend on the political 
situation in Afghanistan after the planned withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition in 2014. 
3. Organization and Resources 
Publicly available knowledge about the organization and available resources of 
these terrorist organizations is scarce and sometimes even confusing. The information 
acquired after the arrests of their members quickly becomes outdated and only partially 
indicates what possibly the current situation is. Since after 2005 there are no indications 
about the existence of the Akramiyyah, its resources will not be analyzed. 
The IMU remains a strong force under the Taliban and has wide networks with 
the other jihadist organizations. From the early 1990s, Namangani mobilized and 
organized a “well trained, flexible in their tactics, and motivated for the higher cause of 
Islam”127 force and “buil[t] up a network of thousands of unarmed ‘sleepers’ in the 
Fergana Valley and other parts of Central Asia who would rise at a signal or provide his 
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guerrillas with food and guides needed.”128 These “permanent guerrilla forces”129 were 
able “to launch operations largely on their own initiative.”130 Their current capabilities 
after the decade of fight against the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan are unclear. While 
the high numbers of imprisoned terrorists131 may imply destruction, the attacks of 2009–
2011 in Tajikistan132 show the opposite. The IMU’s combat experience made it “the most 
lethal enemy force, with highly developed combat skills”133 that included “1,500 
particularly tough Uzbek fighters.”134 By 2009, it reached 2,500–4,500 fighters.135 The 
current IMU, led by Usman Ghazi,136 may have a couple thousand fighters of various 
nationalities. In addition to the cooperation with the Taliban and al Qaeda, it operates 
within a network of jihadist organizations, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 
the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Algeria-based Groupe Islamique 
Armée (GIA), the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Chechen separatist 
groups, and the ethnic Uighur militant Islamists from Xinjiang province of China.137 
While the subordination under bayaat (an oath) to the Taliban’s emir Mulla Omar138 
limits freedom of action, the alliance with such a large organization mostly strengthens 
the IMU and gives good prospects after the NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
The IJU’s organization is similar to the IMU’s, including the relations with the 
Taliban and al Qaeda. Utilizing its networks in Western Europe, Turkey, and 
Caucasus,139 the IJU became “a promoter of international jihad and facilitator for 
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extremist recruits from Turkey and Europe who wish to fight in Afghanistan.”140 
Currently, it may have up to 600 members, including about 200 Uzbeks. The IJU also has 
the reputation of tough Uzbek fighters and is currently led by Suhayl Buranov.141 
From its inception, the Akramiyyah was organized as a clandestine religious 
community that was bind together with mutual help, religious ideology, and resistance to 
Karimov’s regime. Its founder and spiritual leader Akram Yuldashev remains imprisoned 
from 1999. The Akramiyyah comprised trusted owners and workers of small and medium 
enterprises by organizing into the small khalka (cells) of 3–7 persons.142 Apart from the 
number of “about 80 armed members,”143 there is no information about its militant 
organization during the events in Andijan in 2005.  
The main IMU’s and IJU’s resources come from their alliances with the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda and sustain their capabilities. Since the early 2000s the IMU had high-tech 
military equipment and enough funds.144 In addition to the small-arms, both organizations 
also use heavier weaponry, such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), mortars, recoilless 
rifles, surface-to-air missiles, and explosive materials with the expertise in their 
employment.145 Initially the funding was organized by Tahir Yuldashev “from the 
intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey and from Islamic charities and 
organizations in these countries.”146 Another traditional source of the IMU’s incomes—
drug trafficking—may be partially taken over by other criminal groups.147 In 2011, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists in North Africa created opportunities for al 
Qaeda to recover, expand recruitment, and to “export weapons to various areas of 
                                                 
140. Fedlholm, “From the Ferghana,” 27. 
141. Witter, Uzbek, 2. 
142. Babajanov, Akramiya, 1. 
143. NEFA, Role, 3. 
144. Lt. Gen. Boris Mylnikov, Head of the CIS Antiterrorist Center, quoted in Rashid, Jihad, 166. 
145. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” in Jane’s; “Emboldened IJU returns to militant action in 
Uzbekistan,” in Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, June 11, 2009. 
146. Rashid, Jihad, 141. 
147. Sanderson, Kimmage, and Gordon, “From the Ferghana,” 15. 
 31
fighting around the world in order to upgrade their affiliates’ ability.”148 The same year, 
the Taliban and al Qaeda decided to concentrate all resources for a new surge in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.149 The IMU and the IJU still maintain training camps in South 
and North Waziristan regions of Pakistan respectively. Both organizations have 
developed their networks for recruitment and financing in the Western Europe, Turkey, 
and Central Asia.150 Despite the losses caused by the ISAF,151 there are no indications 
that they lack resources to sustain their operations and threaten Uzbekistan in the future.  
4. Recruitment and Popular Support 
While the IMU and the IJU have no shortage of new recruits, the lack of relations 
with Uzbekistan’s population makes the actual public support in Uzbekistan unclear. 
Furthermore, the foreign recruits, while significantly contributing to the growth of these 
organizations, have no interest to focus on Uzbekistan as well.  
The worsening economic conditions, high rates of unemployment, large and 
growing numbers of young males, repressive and corrupt regime provide both the IMU 
and the IJU with the 50–130 new recruits per year from Uzbekistan.152 Similar situations 
in the other Central Asian states, abuses from the corrupt law enforcement structures, 
recent practices of extradition, and genocide against Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan 
force some Muslims to join terrorists in Afghanistan.153 On the other hand, the ideology 
of global jihad is less attractive to the wider Uzbek population whose everyday life is 
dominated by socio-economic problems. This limits the recruitment possibilities in 
Uzbekistan and forces the IMU and the IJU competing for recruitment with the other 
jihadist organizations abroad. The alliance with the Taliban further internationalized the 
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IMU by transferring jihadists from various countries to the latter.154 Sometimes the lack 
of secure training camps, however, is limiting the scope of recruitment.155 Training of the 
suicide bombers156 and even children157 are utilized by the both organizations. In addition 
to the military training, the IMU and the IJU provide religious indoctrination. The 
“Lessons of Jihad” teach new recruits not only tactics and fearless warrior’s behavior but 
also how to manipulate the local population in order to gain their trust and support.158  
Nevertheless, the public support to the Islamic terrorism in Uzbekistan remains 
dubious. Although, in the early 1990s, people in the Fergana Valley accepted the Adolat’s 
militants who assured public order in cities and protected against racketeers, they did not 
believe that Islamic state and sharia could solve economic and social problems.159 The 
fundamentalist Wahhabi or Salafi ideologies are largely alien even to the pious Uzbek 
Muslims and the official clergy, notwithstanding the relatively well-educated and mostly 
secular urban population. According to dr. Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, the IMU’s 
affiliation with the Taliban and al Qaeda “gave it a poisonous tone and led to a pledge of 
jihad […], ensuring that the movement was repulsive to the Uzbek people it hoped to 
attract,” because the radical Islamism, accepted with the money and weapons, made the 
IMU “out of touch with the people at home.”160 During the Soviet period, Uzbekistan’s 
population saw how the fundamentalist regimes in Iran and Afghanistan failed to improve 
life for the ordinary people and even worsened socio-economic conditions. The path of 
criminal activities, terrorism, ideology of global jihad, and the long relocation to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan alienated the IMU and IJU from ordinary Uzbeks.  
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The uncompromising fighting for utopian religious ideas becomes even less 
feasible on the background of the democratic processes in the modern Muslim world. 
While being successful in recruiting Turks, the IJU complained that they were spoiled by 
the democratic society at home and not suitable as jihadist fighters, who are supposed to 
execute every order without questioning it.161 In 2005, the growing number of the IMU 
members leaving this organization and seeking refuge in Western Europe, signaled about 
the decreasing popularity of the IMU.162 The IMU’s criticism of the IJU in 2006 
indicated also the ongoing competition for popularity in Uzbekistan.163  However, the 
worsening domestic situation in Uzbekistan and suitable international environment may 
create a situation where both terrorist organizations would become the only forces 
capable and willing to challenge Karimov’s regime. On the other hand, the successful 
advancements to political power of the MB in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine, and Hezbollah 
in Lebanon are difficult to follow. All those Islamic organizations were living close to the 
people and provided real support to them by conducting social services and assuring 
protection against persecution from the state powers. While the similar Akramiyyah’s 
activities in Fergana were highly appreciated by the local population, the latter were 
largely unaware of the Islamist ideology of this organization. While the MB abandoned 
violence and chose legal political path in Egypt, the persistent violence of Hamas and 
Hezbollah were justified in the eyes of their supporters by the need to fight foreign 
occupants. The IMU and the IJU are fighting abroad, they do not share everyday 
hardships or give help to ordinary Uzbeks, and they are not ready for political 
competition. Although the Akramiyyah could be considered as similar to the Arab 
Islamists, the scale of its activities was too limited and the unsuccessful insurgency 
stopped these in Uzbekistan at all. As a result, the Islamist ideologies do not seem 
popular in Uzbekistan. Judging from the video footage taken on 13 May 2005, the 
people’s behavior and speeches at the meeting in Andijan, apart from anger, grievances, 
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and sporadic shouting “Allah Akbar,” did not indicate any existence of political goals, 
unity, determination for actions, and even less the struggle for Islamic state.164 
D. THREAT OF THE NON-VIOLENT ISLAMIC RADICALISM 
1. Origins and Ideology 
Although the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) rejects violence and is legal in a number of 
countries, its branch in Uzbekistan it is persecuted as a terroristic organization. On the 
other hand, the radical ideology with the ultimate goal to establish Islamic state makes its 
members potentially supportive of the Islamic terrorism and global jihad. Since its 
inception half a century ago, the HT spread worldwide and followed the same heterodox 
ideology. It was founded in 1953 by Palestinian Islamic scholar Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. 
Currently, the HT is an international Sunni Islamist political organization operating in 
many countries. In Central Asia, firstly it appeared in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s.  
Despite the HT’s vision of peaceful transition of state power, its ideology contains 
a lot of uncertainties, discrimination, and coercion that would lead to violence. The 
ultimate goal is the revival of a Caliphate with the elected Caliph who would legitimately 
declare jihad against the states that oppress Muslims and would spread Islam 
worldwide.165 The Islamic state should evolve naturally after the HT has peacefully 
seized power in a country and imposed sharia.166 Despite the numerous publications167 
about the functioning of such a state, a lot of economic, financial, and foreign issues 
remain unclear: they are supposed to develop itself and peculiarities of the modern world 
are mixed with medieval rules. While for political repressions and religious restrictions 
the local HT criticizes Karimov’s regime, for socio-economic difficulties it blames 
democracy.168 The HT also condemns the local Sufism, traditionalism, and “Hanafi 
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version of Sunni Islam.”169 It also claims promotion of the modern Jadids’ ideas but the 
latter are not visible in the HT’s literature.170 A very strong and versatile HT’s 
propaganda denounces all other religions, politico-economic systems, and ideologies.171 
Moreover, Jews and Shia Muslims eventually must leave Muslim countries.172 Such 
ideology cannot be implemented peacefully, because it would discriminate and coerce a 
lot of people in any country. Though usually called as Wahhabi organization, the HT is 
heterodox for it rejects all other Islamic ideologies and movements as ineffective and 
mistaken.173 Despite ideological differences, it is highly possible that the HT members 
would “not sit idly and allow the security forces to kill [the IMU]”174 in case of a massive 
insurgency in Uzbekistan, for they understand the inevitability of war and suffer from 
brutal repressions themselves. Furthermore, despite the UK’s political tolerance to the 
non-violent Islamist organizations, the factual evidence demonstrates the relation 
between the membership in such organizations and Islamic terrorism.175 Similarly, the 
former members of the German HT were among the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 
attacks in the U.S.176 These facts indisputably show the real result of the “non-violent” 
Islamist ideology that fuels extremism and terrorism. 
2. Strategy and Development 
The HT’s strategy and development in Uzbekistan reflects the nature of this 
organization as a political party with a clear political goal to establish an Islamic state. 
An-Nabhani utilized Leninist principles and practices about the political struggle and the 
vanguard role of the party.177 The Uzbek HT follows the common HT strategy that 
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envisions three stages: the first stage of culturing that aims at organizing the local party 
from the convinced and active Muslims; the second stage of interaction that aims to 
educate and involve Muslim society in the struggle for the Islamic state; and the third 
stage of establishing the Islamic state and spreading Islam worldwide.178 The latter 
clearly calls for a global jihad carried by the Islamic military. Excluding Uzbekistan’s 
armed forces from the extensive criticism on the Uzbekistan’s governmental entities, the 
Uzbek HT targets to ally with the former against the secular regime and has a clear vision 
about the future Caliphate’s armed forces.179 Currently, the Uzbek HT is between the first 
and the second stage. Through religious and secular education, proliferation of its 
ideology, expansion of the secret networks in Uzbekistan and the neighboring countries, 
spiritual development, and determination for sacrifices the local HT seeks to mobilize 
Uzbeks into the massive struggle. 
So far, the Uzbek HT tolerates the IMU and the IJU because they promote similar 
ideas and challenge the current regime. In Tajikistan, however, the local official IRP 
supported governmental repressions against the Tajik HT because saw it as a competitor 
Islamist movement.180 The first HT’s pamphlets appeared in the Fergana Valley around 
1995 and were considered by Uzbekistan’s authorities as harmless.181 However, the 
further HT’s expansion into the other regions and cities provoked a massive 
governmental crackdown, especially after the Law on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious organizations adopted in May 1998. The local HT members are the main target 
for Uzbekistan’s security services and are treated worst in the prisons.182 Some HT 
members, escaping from the brutal repressions, flee to Afghanistan and join terrorists.183 
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3. Organization and Resources 
In terms of organization and resources, the HT is a superior Islamic organization 
in Central Asia. Its decentralized structure consists of numerous daira (circle) with 5–7 
members among which only the leader has contact with the higher levels.184 Uzbekistan’s 
HT has 10,000–15,000 members out of “around 25,000 hard core members and many 
more sympathizers in Central Asia.”185 The lowest level consists of poor, often 
unemployed, and poorly educated people and the “leadership comes from intelligentsia 
and the educated middle class.”186 Majority of the members are 20–40 years old. Though 
repressions and young age of the members may lead to violence, the local HT denies any 
formal relations with the IMU, Taliban, or al Qaeda and with the “strict internal 
discipline … avoid[s] infiltration and maintain[s] ideological purity”187 to restrain its 
members from violence. On the other hand, the unity within the Central Asian branches is 
not steadfast. In 2010, the organizational brake in Kyrgyzstan’s HT was fueled by the 
accusations of corruption in the leadership and the weariness of some members from 
governmental persecutions.188 The same can happen in Uzbekistan’s HT as well. 
The international HT network gives to Uzbekistan’s branch not only valuable 
experience from Arab countries to withstand repressions but also helps this organization 
with resources. The local HT’s activities, equipment, communication technologies, 
spread of sophisticated propaganda, and ability to support its followers also indicates 
sufficiency of available resources.189 The financial funds are generated from the local 
members’ donations and foreign support as well. 
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4. Recruitment and Popular Support 
Although the non-violent HT’s ideology well-suits to Uzbek mentality and the 
local HT claims large numbers of recruits, the popular support to this organization in 
Uzbekistan is not obvious and depends on the region. Uzbekistan’s HT is much closer to 
the local population than the terrorist organizations. Despite the image of intellectual 
movement, the actual members come from all levels of the Uzbek society.190 Adjusting 
for the local people, the HT is also not so strict “toward smoking, listening to music, and 
interacting with women.”191 Packed with the HT members, Central Asian prisons became 
a fertile field for recruitment.192 Uzbekistan’s HT also claims having sympathizers in the 
military, intelligence, high echelons of the state, and “within Karimov’s inner circle.”193  
The massive popular support to Uzbekistan’s HT, however, is not certain. In the 
absence of other political opposition, the HT’s ideas about justice, morality, welfare, and 
revival of the glorious past are attractive to the local population that is facing socio-
economic difficulties and is longing for the Soviet past with its equality and social 
security. The repressive and corrupt government also pushes people towards Islamism. 
However, the Wahhabi ideas are alien not only to the majority of Uzbeks but also to the 
pious Muslims preaching the local moderate Islam. That would bring an inevitable clash 
with the modern Uzbek society and the official clergy if the HT tried to impose its ideas 
openly. Moreover, the HT’s propaganda often addresses global issues but miss local 
ones.194 Even if the non-violent ideology give the local HT potential to follow the MB or 
Hamas’ path, Karimov’s regime denies the slightest possibility for it to develop any 
meaningful public presence and massive popular support. The disappointment of the local 
HT’s members with the people’s obedience and passivity is obvious in the need for a 
major crisis that would “expose everybody, force polarization, and the war will begin.”195 
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
The politico-historic environment in Uzbekistan during the last hundred years 
shaped the essence of the Uzbek religiosity and the corresponding perception of the 
Islamism ideas. During the Soviet period, for majority of Uzbeks Islam became just a part 
of their national identity and traditions that did not interfere with their largely secular life. 
However, the Soviet religious policies, sporadic revival of Islam, and influence from the 
foreign Muslim countries caused development of the Islamic radicalism and terrorism. 
Despite the brutal repressive CT policies, Karimov’s regime did not eliminate 
Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. The uncompromised governmental repressions 
forced the Islamists to escape abroad and organize into the IMU and later the IJU. Both 
organizations are closely related to the Taliban and al Qaeda, but their focus on 
Uzbekistan did not fully disappear. Although this alliance is also beneficial for the latter, 
the Uzbek organizations gain significantly more in terms of resources and safe havens. 
Currently, the IMU and the IJU have a potential and a will to threaten Uzbekistan, but the 
U.S.-led coalition keeps them focused on fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 
coalition’s intention to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2014, however, may cause a 
return of the Taliban’s regime and create favorable conditions for both Uzbek terrorist 
organizations to grow and to launch offensive against Karimov’s regime. Since the 
original leaders of the IMU and IJU were killed, the reciprocal disagreements may be 
also easier to resolve. Furthermore, the commonality of significant losses, ethnic 
backgrounds, and common subordinations to the Taliban and al Qaeda make their 
alliance a viable option in the future. The total numbers of their attacks and inflicted 
casualties in Uzbekistan, however, are rather low and have more features of the armed 
clashes between drug traffickers and law enforcement than of the global jihad. Although 
continuous recruitment indicates some appeal of these organizations to Uzbek population, 
the physical, social, and ideological remoteness of the IMU and the IJU from Uzbek 
nation may be a major obstacle for gaining wider public support in this country. 
Although the allegedly large and growing membership of Uzbekistan’s HT 
indicates its higher attractiveness to the local population, the wide popular support cannot 
be taken for granted as well. The HT also has advantages in comparison with the 
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IMU/IJU due to its presence among the people, some resemblance with the Soviet 
ideology, and rejection of violence.196 Despite the non-violent HT’s ideology, the strategy 
of the latter would inevitably lead to violence and even a civil war. Although the local 
HT currently does not present an obvious threat of terrorism or armed insurgency, in the 
future its radical indoctrination may lead young, active, and desperate people towards 
Islamic terrorism. They become susceptible for the militant Islamist ideology and 
escaping from repressions often join the IMU or the IJU. The Akramiyyah’s insurgency 
of 2005 in Andijan is a perfect example of the similar evolution by the entire clandestine 
Islamist organization that claimed non-violent approach. Despite the peaceful HT’s 
ideology, its support to the terrorist organizations is still likely in the case of a massive 
insurgency in the country. 
The current regime in Uzbekistan, so far, did not succeed to fully eliminate the 
threats of Islamic extremism. To the contrary, the continuous recruitment into the violent 
and non-violent Islamic organizations indicates the growing popular discontent with the 
current national authorities. Although the predominant moderate and traditionalist Islamic 
ideology and the rather secular society are the major obstacles for the proliferation of 
Islamic extremism in Uzbekistan, the popular preferences and support may change if the 
existing domestic situation deteriorates. The next chapter, therefore, focuses on the 
strengths and weaknesses of Uzbekistan’s state and the popular support to the latter’s 
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III. COUNTERTERRORIST POLICIES OF UZBEKISTAN  
(1990–2012) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although uneven through the last two decades and even decreasing, the Islamic 
terrorism remains the main threat to security and stability in Uzbekistan. Responding to 
the governmental repressions of 1992, the initial activism of the local Islamist militiamen 
turned into terrorism. The civil war and criminal activities in Tajikistan developed Uzbek 
militants into coherent terrorist force fighting for Islamic state in this country. In 1997, 
the end of this war was a turning point for the Uzbek militant group that eventually 
became the IMU and shifted its focus on Uzbekistan. The latter shift was marked by the 
series of Tashkent bombings in 1999 and continuous armed incursions into Uzbekistan’s 
territory until the late 2000. Although the fight in Aghanistan and later Pakistan largely 
consumed the entire resources of Uzbek terrorists, the IJU several times attempted to 
keep the focus on Uzbekistan through the series of bombings in 2004 and 2009 and the 
Andijan insurgency in 2005. The scope and impact of these attacks inflicted new waves 
of harsh repressions, which still are justified by Karimov’s regime as a necessary 
response to the remaining threat of the Islamic terrorism. 
In 1992, the initial tolerant and even welcoming government attitude towards the 
revival of Islam in Uzbekistan was abruptly transformed into “Karimov’s war” on Islamic 
terrorism and fundamentalism. President Islam Karimov was the main architect for such a 
radical change. The highly autocratic regime allowed his personality and experiences 
play a decisive role in Uzbekistan’s CT policy that remains relatively unchallenged 
through the last 20 years.  
Uzbekistan’s CT policy was founded on the lessons that Karimov draw from his 
memorable encounter with the Adolat in Namagan in 1991. First of all, he was shocked 
by the ability of the local fundamentalists to gain factual power and public support in 
Namangan. From 1989, the Adolat significantly improved public security in the city, 
protected local entrepreneurs from criminal racketeering, and attempted establishment of 
the sharia-based public morality. In other words, it was substituting the official 
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authorities by performing certain governmental functions. The local population largely 
appreciated these activities that peaked with the public humiliation and beating of the 
local corrupt procurator.197 Tahir Yuldashev’s blunt declaration to the President in front 
of the cheering crowds—”Now and here, I am the master! You will talk here but only 
when I allow you! Now, shut up and listen!”—made Karimov realize the danger these 
Islamists presented to the official authorities and the need to annihilate them at any cost. 
Secondly, he understood that the local clergy was not in “control of the Muslim 
community and that overt efforts to politicize the faithful for electoral gain can 
backfire.”198 Finally, the realization of the utility of Islam for ruling Uzbek population 
laid the foundations for Uzbekistan’s policy on religion. The centrality of Karimov’s 
personality in shaping the CT policies was also mirrored in the IMU’s official 
communique that declared a jihad against his regime.199  
This chapter presents the development and actual implementation of Uzbekistan’s 
CT policies during the last two decades and how these affected the direction and content 
of the popular support for Islamists in this country. Firstly, the analysis of the CT strategy 
and related legislation demonstrates the highly suppressive and arbitrary foundations for 
the law enforcement. The following evaluation of the executive powers and their actual 
practices show the state’s capabilities and results in countering the threat of Islamic 
extremism. The description of the political, social, and economic conditions contributes 
to the broader picture about the overall situation in Uzbekistan. The analysis of public 
opinion finalizes the results of Uzbekistan’s CT and partially some other policies that 
have significant impact on the general public support for Uzbekistan’s government. 
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B. STRATEGY AND LEGISLATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM 
1. Strategy on Counterterrorism 
Uzbekistan’s CT strategy can be defined as a total extermination of terrorism and 
uprooting of Islamic fundamentalism in the country at any cost. It is the state who first 
resorted to a violent crackdown on the radical Islamist movements in 1992. Although this 
response immediately triggered the emergence of Islamic terrorism, this strategy was 
based on the presumption that any easiness on Islamic fundamentalism would inevitably 
lead to the armed insurgency against the official regime. President Karimov faced the 
ultimatum-like and utopian requirements: 
“We set five conditions which must be fulfilled by the authorities. First, 
Islam Karimov must come here. Second, he must swear his faithfulness to 
Islam on the Koran and here and now proclaim an Islamic state. Third, 
visiting mosques must become compulsory for all Muslims including 
leaders of the state who must pray together with the people. Fourth, Friday 
should be announced as a day off and fifth to open religious schools 
immediately.”200 
They were developed by the local clergy and announced by Tahir Yuldashev, then one of 
the aggressive activists from a lower social stratum.201 Furthermore, at that time 
Uzbekistan was dominated by the economic chaos and insecurity brought with  the 
breakup of the USSR. Karimov understood that negotiation is not an option and the only 
way to counter such a threat is harsh suppression. Despite the obvious decrease of 
terrorist attacks, this approach remains unchanged. In 2009–2010, the jihadists202 were 
still declared “the main enemy of the state.”203 On the other hand, Karimov understood 
the utility of Islam to manipulate the population.  
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Uzbekistan’s policy on religion rests on a dual foundation: the need to counter 
radical ideology204 and the need to utilize religion for the benefit of the current regime. 
First of all, Karimov had to, at least officially, embrace Islam himself but in a way that 
would not threaten the foundations of the secular state but would denounce religious 
extremism. Although in his book Karimov admits that “religion is a reliable companion 
to human beings, and a natural part of human life,” he emphasizes the parallel existence 
of “secular thinking or a secular way of living.”205 Understanding the necessity “to fill a 
temporary vacuum”206 left after the Communist ideology, Karimov used Islam to support 
Uzbek national identity and deny possibility for any political opposition to employ Islam. 
He also reinterpreted the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights:207 
“[It] clearly separates religion as a part of spirituality and culture from an 
attempt ‘to play the religious card’ for certain political aims. We support 
the idea that religion should accomplish its role in introducing the highest 
spiritual, moral and ethical values, and in forming a part of the historical 
and cultural heritage among the population. And we will never allow 
religious slogans […] in the struggle for power—a pretext for intervention 
in politics, economy and legislation—because in this we see a serious 
potential threat to the stability and security of our state.”208 
Hence, his strategy on religion means a thorough control of all religious activities in the 
country. This includes production and dissemination of religious literature and materials, 
religious and secular education, registration and licensing of religious organizations and 
clergy, and harsh sanctions for non-compliance. Warning Uzbek youth about the illegal 
religious education, Karimov emphasized that “Trying to escape the subordination to 
authority may result in a personal tragedy.”209 As a result, the governmental approach 
towards religion represents an essential part in the overall CT strategy. 
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From 1992 on, Karimov set the foundations for the merciless and broad CT 
strategy. He portrayed religious extremism, largely named as Wahhabism and later as 
jihadism, as the evil danger that scares mankind and, hence, must be decisively 
eliminated from the civilized world.210 Stating that, “Such people must be shot in the 
head. If necessary I will shoot them myself,”211 he left no hopes for compromises in 
dealing with religious extremists. Although promising amnesty for repentant terrorists in 
1999, the official incitements, in contrary to the Constitution,212 also threatened to 
victimize families of the suspected terrorists and further expanded the mandate for law 
enforcement.213 The same year, in concert with the other official statements of similar 
nature, Karimov asserted that he is “prepared to rip off the heads of 200 people, to 
sacrifice their lives, in order to save peace and calm in the republic.”214 Such an official 
rhetoric cleared way for violation of human rights and arbitrary actions of the law 
enforcement structures and made Uzbekistan infamous for its inhumane CT policies. 
Another important part of Uzbekistan’s CT strategy is, despite the highly 
repressive actual policies, keeping Karimov’s image attractive both to the local 
population and international partners. He is portrayed as “sincerely desir[ing] democratic 
reforms and a free press, but that officials in charge of implementing the policies are 
subverting his goals.”215 Such propaganda mirrors the Soviet propaganda and is similarly 
used in the other Central Asian states. Following the strategy on religion, former 
Communist Karimov embraced Islam, openly followed Islamic traditions, and officially 
expressed support for a moderate and traditional version of the local Islam.216  
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The threat of terrorism was useful for the current regime on the international 
arena as an excuse for delaying democratization, economic reforms, and limitations on 
human rights. Uzbekistan has entered a sufficient number of international agreements the 
actual implementation of which could establish a socio-political environment respectful 
of human rights and democracy. In 1995, Uzbekistan acceded to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Optional Protocol to ICCPR (ICCPR-
OP1), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) and Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CTOCIDTP). On the other hand, the more specific 
and strict agreements of similar nature, such as the Optional Protocol to ICESCR (OP-
ICESCR), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW), and Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) remain unacceptable to Karimov’s regime.217 On the 
regional level, Uzbekistan is a member of the Eurasian Group against Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing (EAG) and of the Convention against Terrorism of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). A more detailed analysis of the international part of 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies is presented in the next chapter. The next section analyzes how 
the repressive CT strategy matches the above-mentioned international commitments in 
the actual legislation of Uzbekistan. 
2. National Legislation Related to Counterterrorism 
Uzbekistan’s legislation not only fully reflected Karimov’s strategy on CT and 
religion starting from 1992 but also served as a handy tool to maintain a favorable image. 
The actual role of the bicameral Supreme Assembly or Oliy Majlis (national parliament) 
is quite minor. Hence, the legislative process never presented difficulties for Karimov in 
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legalizing the CT and religion policies.218 Despite the need to disguise the actual brutality 
of intentions, the closer analysis of the laws essentially compromises the official 
governmental rhetoric about human rights and democracy. While Karimov cannot stop 
the related foreign criticism, he protected himself inside the country by The Law on 
Protecting the Honor and Dignity of the President that makes criticism on him illegal. 
The following analysis is focused on the legislation related to Uzbekistan’s policies on 
CT and religion. It starts with the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (1992), 
continues with the legislation on public associations, religion, and terrorism, and finalizes 
with the Criminal Code (1994).  
The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan declares adherence to human 
rights, ideals of democracy and social justice, and rule of law and priority of the 
international law. Article 11 also sets a “separation of power between the legislative, 
executive and judicial authorities.”  Article 18 assures equal rights and freedoms without 
discrimination by religion and convictions. Article 26 states that “No one may be subject 
to torture, violence or any other cruel or humiliating treatment.” Respect to personal 
honor and privacy, freedom of thought, speech, and convictions, and freedom of 
conscience, religion, and associations for all are confirmed in Articles 27, 29, 31, 33, and 
34. However, public associations and political parties based on religious principles are 
forbidden by Article 57. While Article 61 separates religion from the state and points that 
“the state shall not interfere with the activity of religious associations,” Article 67 grants 
freedom of media and forbids censorship. Articles from 13 to 17 confirm Uzbekistan’s 
adherence to democracy, human rights and freedoms, social justice and legality, and her 
conformity with “other universally recognized norms of international law.” In summary, 
this Constitution sets foundation for a democratic, secular, and socially just state that 
considers the human being as the ultimate value and strongly limits religious activities. 
Although the legislation related to public associations remains highly restrictive 
and threatens with harsh sanctions, some later improvements and new drafts seem to 
present more rights to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In 1991, the Law on 
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Public Associations (1991) introduced strict and complex registration procedures, banned 
activities of unregistered associations, and left wide rights for the governmental bodies to 
close these associations and confiscate their property. In 2003, some registration 
responsibilities were transferred from the Ministry of Foreign affairs to the Ministry of 
Interior and the related re-registration process,219 which significantly reduced the number 
of the NGOs, was introduced. However, from 2005 the government started annual 
financial assistance to NGOs.220 Although from 2007 the Law on guarantees of activity 
of nongovernmental nonprofit organizations canceled possible confiscation of the NGOs’ 
property and improved some other rights, there still remains “a certain degree of 
vagueness and ambiguity, which may result in the legislation not being applied in a 
coherent and uniform manner, which may further open the way for arbitrary 
administrative decisions to be issued on their basis.”221 The overall legislation on public 
associations still requires complex and lengthy registration, leaves vague grounds for 
refusal to register, puts burdensome reporting on activities requirements, and threatens 
with harsh sanctions in case of non-compliance.222 There are no indications about fewer 
requirements in the future as well. Nevertheless, the Presidential resolution “On 
Measures to support the independent institute for monitoring the formation of civil 
society”223 may indicate not only his formal compliance with the criticism from 
international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments but also his genuine interest 
to have better monitoring on the actual implementation of the legislation in Uzbekistan. 
Moreover, considering the draft laws On Social Partnership, On Public Control, and On 
Activities of Government Entities,224 the future for NGOs seems promising in terms of 
their rights and activities.  
                                                 
219. Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Resolution # 543, December 11, 2003. 
220. ICNL, NGO. 
221. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Comments on the Draft Laws of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan on Civil Society Organizations and on the Guaranties of Activity for Non-State 
Non-Profit Organizations, December 9, 2005. 
222. ICNL, NGO. 
223. Presidential Resolution No. ПП-1576, О Мерах по Поддержке Независимого Института 
Мониторингу Формирования, July 12, 2011. 
224. ICNL, NGO. 
 49
The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (1998) strongly 
limits religious activities and associations in Uzbekistan. It starts from the primacy of the 
international laws, repeats the Constitutional separation of religion from state, hints to the 
potential religious threat to the national security, and gives no privileges to the 
predominant religion of Islam. Restrictions start from Article 5 that forbids creation of 
political parties based on religion, establishment of any representations of the foreign 
religious parties, and utilization of religion “for violation of common morality and civil 
consensus, spread of defamatory and destabilizing interpretations.” However, due to the 
absence of the definitions of the latter illegal purposes, such restrictions allow an 
inadequate limitation on freedom of expression and contradict with Article 19 of the 
ICCPR. Article 7 forbids religion in the system of public education and Article 9 
constrains curriculum in religious education entities and forbids private religious 
teaching. The establishment and activities of religious organizations is heavily burdened 
with the excessive registration requirements, licensing of religious teachers and schools, 
and wide mandate for the governmental institutions to control and close them. Article 14 
forbids religious clothing in public except for the clergy but does not specify that same 
clothing. According to Article 19, the local production and distribution of religious 
literature and materials requires licensing and foreign religious literature and materials 
are subject to governmental approval. In the same article, production, possession, and 
distribution of any religious materials “containing ideas of religious extremism, 
separatism, and fundamentalism” is forbidden. However, the absence of detailed official 
definitions of the latter ideas leaves a lot of space for arbitrary judgments and 
punishments by the various governmental agencies, especially assuming the supposedly 
low level of religious knowledge in these agencies. Furthermore, there are no description 
of the legal procedures for the inclusion or exclusion of religious organizations, literature, 
and materials into the category of forbidden and for the corresponding appeals.225  
The Law on Combating Terrorism (2000) is on a qualitatively higher level among 
the other CT legislation and perhaps indicates a general improvement in Uzbek 
legislation. This law sets the framework of CT activities in Uzbekistan and abroad. It 
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provides a list of the main notions, organization of the participating governmental 
institutions, and application of various measures in prevention of, reaction to, and 
recovery from terrorist acts. The law allows, if needed, the establishment of restrictive 
public regime in the zone of antiterrorist operation. While Article 3 emphasizes principles 
of “legality [and] priority of rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of individuals,” it also 
stresses priority of prevention measures and “inevitability of punishment.” 
The Criminal Code, in general, states harsh punishments for the violation of the 
above-described laws but is less hard on violators of human rights. The main articles 
applicable to terrorism, religion, and associations in this code are:  
 139—Denigration: from 50 minimal monthly wages (mmw) up to six 
years of imprisonment (yoi); 
 140—Insult: from 50 mmw up to 3 years of correctional labor (yocl); 
 155—Terrorism: 15–20 yoi; 
 158—Offences against President of Republic of Uzbekistan: from 3 yocl 
up to 20 yoi; 
 159—Attempts to subvert the Constitutional Order of Republic of 
Uzbekistan: from 250 mmw up to 20 yoi; 
 161—Sabotage: 10–20 yoi; 
 216—Illegal Establishment of Public Associations or Religious 
Organizations: from 50 mmw up to 5 yoi; 
 2161—Inducement to Participate in Operation of Illegal Public 
Associations or Religious Organizations: from 25 mmw up to 3 yoi; 
 2162— Violation of Legislation on Religious Organizations:  50 mmw up 
to 3 yoi; 
  244—Riots:  10–15 yoi; 
 2441—Production and Dissemination of Materials Containing Threat to 
Public Security and Public Order: from 50 mmw up to 8 yoi; 
  2442—Establishment, Direction of or Participation in Religious 
Extremist, Separatist, Fundamentalist or Other Banned Organizations: 5–
20 yoi. 
This code translates the already repressive CT strategy into the possibility for 
arbitrary and disproportional punishments. It contradicts with the ICCPR’s major articles 
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related to extremism and religious activities.226 Following the earlier-mentioned 
vagueness in the CT legislation, this Code also “makes no distinction between direct 
involvement, indirect complicity and assisting the perpetrator.”227 Since articles 159 and 
2441 make no distinction between incitements for violent or peaceful call for political 
changes and definition of “illegal organization” is absent, such legislation factually 
forbids any expression of dissent with the official policies and preserves the existing 
regime. Hence, this code can also be applied towards the secular non-violent political 
opposition. As a result, the CT legislation allows similar punishments for a wide range of 
violators: from ordinary people discontent with the current situation and simply pious 
Muslims up to the highly violent and organized terrorists. Yet, Articles 155, 159, and 
2442 foresee the exemption from liability in case of voluntary and timely warning about 
the illegal activities and collaboration with the law enforcement. Yet, the law is less harsh 
on law enforcement officials in case of torture. Article 110 does not define torture as in 
the Convention against Torture and even uses deceptive word: instead of torture (pytka in 
Russian) it has tormenting (istiazanije). This article provides few general statements with 
a careful wording but no association with the law enforcement agents. Furthermore, 
Article 110 gives punishments significantly lower (max 3–5 yoi) than the ones related 
with intentional serious and medium bodily harms (max 8–10 yoi) described in Articles 
104 and 105. Such evasion echoes with the previously-mentioned official rhetoric and 
opens dangerous avenue for the arbitrary actions and rampage by the CT personnel. The 
Soviet-like system of the procurators, who exercise both prosecution and investigation 
functions, “limits the pretrial rights of defendants.”228 Still, the Uzbek legislation on the 
organization, functions, responsibilities, and support of the law enforcement entities 
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uniformly repeats the adherence to the principles of legality, equality against the law, 
respect of human and civil rights and freedoms, humanity, and internationalism.229 
C. COUNTERTERRORIST ORGANIZATION, RESOURCES, AND 
MEASURES IN UZBEKISTAN 
1. Organizational Framework for Counterterrorism 
The organizational framework for CT covers many governmental entities and 
provides the President with an unrestricted power over it. The National Security Service 
(NSS) is assigned with the overall coordination and supervision of the CT activities, is 
given the status of the state committee, and is subordinated to the President.230 The Law 
on Combating of Terrorism also defines competences of the other institutions 
participating in the CT area: Ministry of Interior, State Border Guards Committee, State 
Customs Committee, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry on Emergency Situations. In 
addition to this rather unified subordination (Fig. 3), after the Andijan events in 2005, 
Karimov expanded his influence even more by transferring some of the internal troops 
from the Ministry of Interior to the NSS and by replacing a number of top civilian and 
military officials with the representatives of his clan.231  
The President, as head of the National Security Council, can declare a state of war 
or of emergency and, as Commander in Chief, lead the entire armed forces. 232 Such a 
setting provides the unity of command over the whole CT organization. The NSS is a 
national intelligence agency responsible for protection of the national security from 
foreign and domestic threats and coordination of the other law enforcement agencies.233 
The Ministry of Interior at the national level is responsible for “rooting out the domestic 
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causes of terrorism and fighting corruption [and] at the local level […] for prosecuting 
criminal and traffic offenses and maintaining general law and order.”234  
Despite the constitutional separation of powers, Karimov exercises decisive 
influence over the highest bodies of the state power. He can dissolve Oliy Majlis, appoint 
most of the top officials and all judges, and nominate 16 out of 100 senators.235 
Considering the actual usurpation of the state power and the harsh nature of Karimov’s 
policies on terrorism and religion, the effectiveness of the Ombudsman office at the Oliy 
Majlis is highly dubious. The Committee on Religious Affairs is responsible and 
empowered for coordinating the implementation of the policies on religion and is 
utilizing for that function many state institutions down to the mahallas or city block civic 
organizations.236 
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Figure 3.   Framework of the counterterrorism organization.237  
2. Counterterrorism Resources 
The scarcity of the reliable information about the CT resources limits the detailed 
analysis; however, the available information and deduction from the known CT activities 
indicates a relative profusion of these resources. The NSS, as the principle national 
intelligence agency, is “a key pillar of […] [Karimov’s] authoritarian regime”238 not only 
due to its formal position but also due to its exceptional trust from and loyalty to the 
President. After the transformation of the former KGB (rus. Komitet Gosudarstvenoiy 
Bezopasnosti (former Soviet State Security Committee)) in to the NSS (approx. 700 
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personnel),239 most of the former cadres were retained and consequently relations with 
the Russian counterparts were sustained for the future cooperation. In terms of troops, the 
NSS has a “battalion-strength special operations force […] which has incorporated the 
elite ‘Scorpion’ special forces company.”240 The Border Guards consist of 900 personnel, 
work in close cooperation with the NSS, and together with the latter “form the backbone 
of Uzbek security community.”241 Uzbekistan’s Customs is responsible for prevention of 
illegal transit “of drugs, weapons and politically and religiously undesirable literature”242 
and is also closely related to the NSS. Consequently, these three services are best 
equipped and provided with infrastructure. The professionalization of the Border Guard 
force and development of strong Special Forces are high on the governmental list of 
security priorities.243 The international cooperation helps Uzbekistan to equip and train 
security forces. The international exercises mainly involve the SCO countries and have 
growing military involvement.  
Uzbek military forces are the largest in the region and are estimated at around 
63,000 of active military, 100,000 reserves, and up to 20,000 paramilitary personnel from 
the civilian security services. The primary role of the army is to react to the internal 
threats, such as insurgency and terrorist attacks, especially across the borders. Uzbek 
army, consisting of 50,000 personnel, for that purpose, has several quick reaction units 
most suitable for counterinsurgency (COIN) and CT operations: light mountain brigade, 
air assault brigade, and special forces (rus. Spetsnaz) unit. Furthermore, Tashkent keeps 
“an ongoing military reform program that aims to downsize the army while strengthening 
the border guards and the special forces.”244 Despite the relatively large numbers of 
personnel and aircraft, Uzbek Air Force’s contribution to COIN/CT warfare is limited 
due to the lack of training and specialized equipment. Nevertheless, they are capable of 
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providing considerable close air support and transportation for the ground troops. 
Although, in general, Uzbek military “equipment is not modern, and training, while 
improving, is neither uniform nor adequate yet for its new mission of territorial 
security,”245 the armed forces, so far, have been able to quickly neutralize the IMU/IJU 
incursions from Afghanistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan territories. The President’s goal is 
to develop capable forces against the “three key threats […]: terrorism, religious 
extremism and drugs-related crime […] [with possibilities for] pre-emptive strikes and 
intelligence operations against terrorist groups deployed in neighboring states.”246 The 
modernization of the Air Force is also directed to support small-scale ground operations 
against the possible terrorist incursions from abroad.247  
Although Uzbekistan’s police is also rather numerous, it is significantly less 
developed than the other forces. Comprising almost 25,000 personnel distributed 
throughout the country, it “has been left largely unreformed, under-funded and 
underequipped.”248 On the other hand, being closer to the mahallas and people, its 
everyday activities and behavior can potentially make the strongest impact on the popular 
support to the entire national law enforcement organization. Although information about 
the penitentiary forces and conditions in prisons is very limited, it is safe assuming that 
Uzbek penitentiary services face similar lack of resources, training, and equipment as 
their counterparts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.249 
The lack of modern equipment and low morale are the main weaknesses of 
Uzbekistan’s security forces. Currently they are largely equipped with the old design ex-
Soviet weapon systems with decreasing reliability and increasing maintenance costs. 
Uzbekistan is partially solving the major lack of modern equipment (especially for 
COIN/CT tasks, such as surveillance, command and control, and communications 
equipment and precise guided ammunition) through the international military cooperation 
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programs. Their scope and content varies in accordance to the dynamics of the 
international relations: 
 “Russia will boost supplies of arms and military hardware to Uzbekistan. 
Russia is currently the only country supplying Tashkent with weapons. 
Assistance from the U.S. and China will probably take the form of 
supplies of modern border-surveillance equipment. The U.S. may also 
provide Tashkent with funding to buy Russian arms. European Union 
support will consist of advice.”250 
The main recipients of the modern U.S. equipment until 2005 were the NSS, Border 
Guards, and Ministry of Interior, but after the Andijan events in 2005 the armed forces, 
with the increasing focus on COIN/CT operations, also benefited from the international 
military aid.251 In addition, there is a realistic expectation in Uzbekistan to receive large 
amounts of equipment (including also lethal) from the ISAF withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.252 For protection of the general population, Uzbekistan also acquires some 
modern equipment for the public transportation sector.253 The low morale is a problem 
among the military and police personnel. This weakness is characteristic to many post-
Soviet force structures whose real transformation was delayed for years and was 
exacerbated by poor pay, decreasing discipline, and lack of material support. 
Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s police’s situation is worsened by the omnipresent corruption. 
While the overall Uzbekistan’s expenditures for security are not publicly 
available, the information on military expenditures allows making assumptions about the 
former. The absolute figures of the defense budget were continuously rising and the same 
dynamic is envisioned at least till 2015. In 2011, the actual expenditures for defense 
reached $1.75 billion, which represent 4.85% of GDP, and in 2012 it is planned to reach 
$1.9 billion.254 In addition, the U.S. military aid is growing as well: from $100,000 in 
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2011 to $1.5 million in 2012.255 However, considering the role of the law enforcement 
and security services in the CT strategy and supporting Karimov’s regime, it is 
reasonable to assume that their financing is sufficient.  
Finally, the wide range of other governmental organizations constitutes, even if 
less visible, another major component of the CT resources. The 12,000 local mahalla 
committees serve as indispensable source of information on potential extremists, 
“assign[…] a ‘neighborhood guardian,’ or ‘posbon,’ whose job [is] to ensure public order 
and to maintain a proper moral climate in the neighborhood … [, and] … link local 
society and the lowest levels of the Government and law enforcement.”256 The public 
education system, government owned or controlled media, and local authorities are 
employed not only for the CT function but also for the implementation of the state’s 
control on religion. 
3. Implementation of the Counterterrorism Strategy 
Due to the significant drawbacks of the governmental entities, the actual 
implementation of the CT strategy made Uzbekistan infamous for its harsh and 
indiscriminate repression, violation of human rights, and widespread corruption. The first 
major governmental crack-down on the radical Islamists started in 1992 in Fergana 
Valley. The official incitements to persecute families of the hiding terrorists were also 
widely utilized in this region starting with the families of Tahir Yuldashev and Juma 
Namangani.257 In 1997, killings of several law enforcement officials in the same region 
triggered another wave of arrests and imprisonments. In response to the Tashkent 
bombings of 1999, the governmental repression expanded into the other regions and 
exploited the earlier-described violent governmental rhetoric to the full extent.258 Despite 
the official humane norms in the related legislation, arbitrary arrests, torture, and ill-
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treatment of suspects became the usual practices of Uzbek law enforcement.259 From 
then on, the CT policies only became harsher and involved wider population. Although 
the Andijan massacre in 2005 caused a wide international resonance and condemnation of 
Uzbekistan’s government by the foreign states and international organizations, the 
following wave of persecutions by Uzbek law enforcement demonstrated the unshakeable 
nature of Karimov’s CT strategy.260 Although extraditions of the suspected Uzbek 
Islamists from the Western countries are often hampered due to the threat of potential 
torture in Uzbekistan, the same process usually works smoothly among the SCO 
members.261 Despite the obviously decreased level of the Islamic terrorism and wide 
international criticism, Uzbekistan’s CT policies not only remain on the same course but 
are expanding into the other areas of public and individual life.262 
Uzbekistan’s war against terrorism also became widely utilized against every 
potential threat to Karimov’s regime. Right from the early 1990s, the CT policies were 
applied against religion. Gradually more pious people were turned into the “enemies of 
the state”263 and unregulated religious activities equalized to terrorism. Simple 
possession of unofficial religious material or overt religious discourse was considered as 
open agitation against the constitutional order. The more pious people are treated as 
terrorists and even worse than ordinary criminals.264 Continuous harassment, torture, 
disappearances, and disproportional criminal persecution are directed against the human 
rights activists, journalists, secular opposition, and even discontent ordinary citizens.265 
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The arbitrary application of the CT legislation and unrestrained corruption within 
the law enforcement and security structures significantly worsen the Uzbekistan’s 
situation. Starting from the mid-1990s, Uzbek law enforcement rampaged against any 
opposition and ignored the international commitments of Uzbekistan.266 The independent 
report about Uzbek procurators’ and courts’ practices of 2009–2010 shows the abundance 
of arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, unrestricted interpretation of the vague 
legislation, systematic tortures, ill-treatment, and persistent violations of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure.267 In this report, Vitaly Ponomarev, head of the Central Asia 
program of the Moscow-based Memorial group, emphasized that “all of them [suspects] 
were charged with the offences of membership of a banned organization, distributing 
literature that threatens public security, anti-constitutional activity or setting up an illegal 
religious organization”268 and often these charges were based not on the concrete actions 
of these suspects but on the declared or implied goals of those organizations. Despite the 
limited access to the accusation materials, he rightfully assumes the full absence of the 
concrete evidence linking the suspects with the IMU or the IJU and concludes that “the 
[governmental] response is not commensurate with the risks, and is thus unjustifiable; 
and that repression itself is the major destabilizing factor and poses greater risks to 
regional security than groups like the IMU do.”269 
As a result of such a distorted law enforcement system, Uzbekistan’s penitentiary 
system is incapable of dealing with a large number of prisoners. According to 
Ponomarev, the numbers of political prisoners in Uzbekistan are considerably higher than 
in the rest of the former Soviet Union put together and blacklists include tens of 
thousands of the local people, who potentially are the subjects for criminal 
persecution.270 Due to the low morale of the governmental personnel and widely spread 
corruption, the local penitentiary system succumbs under the pressure of imprisoned 
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criminals and Islamists, which utilize prisons for the propagation of the radical Islamism. 
Despite the harshest treatment in the prisons, the Islamists retain their dedication, 
organize internal networks, and maintain outside relations. The actual influence of the 
latter gradually becomes even stronger than that of the common criminals who through 
the obshchak271 and bribing have an informal control over the prisons’ administrations.  
The omnipresent corruption is a major problem for the entire law enforcement 
system in Uzbekistan. As in the whole country, which in the latest Corruption 
Perceptions Index is ranked 177 out of 183 (where the higher number means higher 
corruption),272 corruption prosper in the law enforcement system. The local police 
personnel even resort to blackmailing “known to be devout Muslims and threaten to 
denounce them as extremists to the security services unless they hand over money, 
livestock or other property.”273 Considering the well-known law enforcement practices of 
torturing and arbitrary judicial institutions, it is not surprising that ordinary people avoid 
informing law officials about this and try to give away everything in order to save 
themselves and their families. Other people, facing unbearable persecution, leave the 
country and sometimes join the IMU or the IJU. Although the shield of secrecy and 
considerably higher professionalism of the NSS may portray this institution as immune 
from corruption, the worsening economic conditions and a vast scale of smuggling in 
Uzbekistan create a very tempting environment not only for the Border Guards and 
Customs but for the NSS as well.274 Information about the outcomes of such cases is 
largely hidden from the population.275 Furthermore, according to the International Crisis 
Group, “corruption and poor governance is a trademark of all three of the countries 
[including Uzbekistan] that border Afghanistan, making for a challenging economic 
environment in which it is all the more difficult to implement effective counter-terrorism 
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measures.”276 Finally, such behavior of the Uzbek law enforcement becomes a source of 
grievance and even Islamic radicalization for the abused people. 
The level of incompetence of the local governmental institutions is another 
negative factor related to the effectiveness of Uzbekistan’s CT policies. Following the 
crackdown on Islamic fundamentalist groups in Fergana valley in the early 1990s,277 the 
local governmental entities, under the supervision and guidance from the NSS and the 
Committee on Religious Affairs, continued persecution of religious people through the 
whole country. Once again, the two categories of clergy were identified. That situation 
looked very similar to the Soviet one. The difference, however, was in the religious 
content of the unofficial religious ideology. Now the unofficial ulama propagated pure 
Islam and were seeking establishment of the Islamic state, while the state and the official 
clergy supported traditionalism and mix of the national heritage with religion.278 While 
Karimov’s regime supports “religious activity through the officially-registered mosques 
and clerics who are close to the regime and who enjoy some authority among the 
population […] [it uses] greater repression of independent Muslims and illegal religious 
groups, so as to root out domestic ‘enemies.’”279 As a result, there were imprisoned large 
numbers of people who were guilty only of unsanctioned studies of Islam, possession of 
religious materials or membership in the banned organizations and movements, including 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, Said Nursi, Tabligi Jamoat, non-Islamic minorities, and some other local 
non-violent religious groups.280 Such an approach indicates a striking ignorance on the 
governmental side about the essential differences of religious ideologies. Similar 
ineffectiveness exists in the fighting against the terrorist financing. Although the 
respective legislation is in place, the existence of the large black-market allows 
significant financial flows avoiding the governmental control and Karimov’s regime 
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cannot brag about any seizure of terrorist assets.281 From 2012, Uzbekistan strengthens 
cooperation with the other member states of the SCO in the field of money laundering 
and control of the information accessible over the Internet.282 The latter initiatives 
represent a desperate governmental attempt to hide from the people any information that 
could somehow influence the public opinion in Uzbekistan and undermine popular 
support to Karimov’s regime.  
D. PUBLIC SUPPORT IN UZBEKISTAN 
1. Political Situation in Uzbekistan 
The nature of the existing regime, level of democracy, rule of law, and respect to 
human and civil rights and freedoms are the factors that shape popular perception about 
the political situation in the country and influence public support to the government. 
Contrary to the constitution, authoritarian Karimov’s rule has actually concentrated all 
power within the executive branch. As a result, only the President and his apparatus have 
monopoly on justice in Uzbekistan. While religious opposition is illegal, the secular 
political opposition is also largely persecuted and dispersed.283 The democratic parties 
Erk and Birlik were persecuted from the early 1990s in the country but continue operating 
from abroad. Due to the high level of governmental repression, the incitement for 
massive protests or even insurgency is still futile.284 This situation confirms the general 
notion about the compliant and obedient character of Uzbek nation, which continues 
suffering from violations of human rights and absence of democracy without joining into 
united opposition. The NSS, as the major pillar of Karimov’s regime, is able to produce 
incriminating material on every political figure or social activist and annihilate them 
through the harsh machine of the law enforcement.285 The existing legal political parties, 
in essence, are supportive of the current regime, do not represent any challenge to the 
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latter, and have only cosmetic differences in their programs.286 According to the most 
foreign countries and all international organizations, the electoral system in Uzbekistan is 
considered as totally corrupt; hence, Uzbekistan has the lowest rank for freedom and 
extremely low indicator of voice and accountability.287 While some indicators of 
governmental performance—political stability, violence, and government effectiveness—
significantly improved from 2005, the others—regulatory quality, rule of law, and control 
of corruption—remain very low and even worsened further.288 The improvements can be 
attributed to the consolidation of Karimov’s regime, annihilation of opposition, and 
control of information. 
The earlier-described unrestricted behavior of Uzbek law enforcement could 
undermine the popular perception of the legitimacy of the governmental policies against 
terrorism. There were several major crackdowns on the Islamic and secular opposition in 
Uzbekistan, but the Andijan events in 2005 can be used as the best example that fully 
illustrates the governmental approach on popular discontent. First of all, the reason for 
this insurgency was caused by the arbitrary arrests of the successful local businessmen, 
which were honored and trusted by the local population, on the charges of clandestine 
religious terrorist organization. The threatening and largely illegal behavior of the local 
law enforcement personnel and the corresponding perception of the local people 
demonstrated the governmental ignorance of religious matters and shocking disregard of 
the population.289 The local governmental authorities demonstrated low competence by 
not handling the raising popular discontent peacefully. The employment of the armed 
forces, shootings into the crowds of people, following persecutions, and numbers of 
refugees were caused by a non-proportional and indiscriminate use of force against the 
general civilian population. Finally, after seven years there was no independent 
investigation on these events allowed and no officials accused of unlawful behavior.290  
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Furthermore, corruption is prevailing in most spheres of the public life and Karimov, 
with all his power at hand, is not doing much to pull up Uzbekistan from the lowest ranks 
of the corrupt countries.291  
The persistent violation of human and civilian rights and freedoms is another 
characteristic of the current regime that should negatively influence public support to 
Uzbekistan’s government. The violations of human rights are not limited only with the 
torturing and abuses from the law enforcement and strict control of religion. The freedom 
of thought and speech is severely limited by the regime as well. The governmental 
persecution of journalists292 and editors who try to spread information compromising the 
official authorities ranges from individual harassments and professional interference to 
criminal charges and long imprisonments. Although two decades of such policy made the 
pro-government media outlets dominating in the country and the practice of self-
censorship a norm for the local media,293 the progressive journalists still continue 
challenging the authorities.294 Uzbekistan’s government limits access to the Internet, 
refuses translation of the opposing foreign radio (e.g. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Voice of America, and BBC World Service), denies accreditation to foreign journalists 
and media outlets, and intervenes into the academic freedom and cultural events.295 The 
information about the Arab Spring, due to its potential applicability in Central Asia, was 
also manipulated in the Uzbek official media.296 Although the IMU’s and the IJU’s 
Islamic propaganda was successful in Western Europe and Turkey, the restrictions and 
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censorship on the public media limited the public access to such information in 
Uzbekistan. The activists of human and civil rights also experience severe persecution 
that also involves their families. To counter the persistent international pressure, the 
regime from time to time releases few imprisoned activists just to imitate improvement 
but the overall situation is even worsening.297  
The pro-government media, at the same time, portrays Karimov and his regime as 
the only guarantors of security and stability in Uzbekistan that is continuously threatened 
by the internal and external enemies who try to impose different and dangerous thinking. 
Karimov’s intolerance for independent activism, opinion, and resulting criticism is 
prevailing in the official restrictions on international organizations. Despite the 
governmental financing of the NGOs and some minor improvements, the actual 
restrictions on the NGO activities and un-proportional punishment in this country are still 
prevailing. Uzbekistan’s courts continue closing representative offices of the international 
organizations that dare to criticize the current regime (e.g., the Institution of New 
Democracies in spring of 2010 and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) in June 2011).298 
The whole regime’s campaign for control of public information indicates a strong 
fear of the alternative information and fully mirrors with the former Soviet approach on 
control of people’s mind and behavior. Eventually, such a repressive regime and the 
factual absence of the rule of law may even lead to an armed insurgency: 
“Starting from mid-2008, we’ve seen a growing trend towards politically-
motivated criminal cases. […] The level of repression is now higher than 
in its previous peak period of 2004 to 2006. […] The deployment mass 
repression as a core instrument of state policy has been a major source of 
instability […]. Under certain circumstances […] Uzbekistan is most 
likely to experience the Libyan scenario rather than the Egyptian one.” 299 
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2. Economic and Social Situation in Uzbekistan 
The national economic and social situations are the other two factors that 
determine the level of people’s satisfaction with their life conditions and respectively 
contribute to the general support to their government. According to the official figures 
and international assessments on Uzbek economy, the economic situation may look quite 
good and improving. Due to the large natural resources and favorable export prices, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Economist Intelligence Unit provided quite 
favorable prognosis for Uzbekistan’s economy with the annual growth of GDP more than 
7 per cent in 2011–2013 but also with a high level of inflation ranging from 10 to 20 per 
cent.300 The reliability of the official Uzbekistan’s data is still questionable when the 
percentage of unemployment provided by Tashkent is up to 40 times less than that of the 
international assessments. Such a cheating with the official data is another characteristic 
of Uzbekistan inherited from the Soviet past and is strongly related to the official 
propaganda supporting Karimov’s regime. Furthermore, the combination of the state-
controlled economy, lack of liberal reforms, and omnipresent corruption makes all 
economic improvement retained only by the loyal and corrupt elites in this country.301 
The growing dissatisfaction with the restrictions on private businesses was one of the 
main reasons for civilian protests already in 2004–2005. 
As a result, despite the favorable economic indicators largely founded on the vast 
natural resources, the general population is not experiencing economic improvement. The 
minimal increase of the state budget expenditures by 0.1 per cent for social development 
and support and healthcare302 is actually a significant decrease considering the high level 
of inflation. The real problems of Uzbekistan’s economy are visible through the growing 
unemployment and poverty that in return increases social and ethnic division. While 
actual unemployment is estimated around 8 per cent and underemployment around 25 
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percent, the latter reaches 62 per cent in the rural areas.303 The latter figure is especially 
worrisome considering the generally high percentage of young population in Uzbekistan 
and the higher religiosity in the rural areas that makes these regions more susceptible to 
the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism. Approximately 26 per cent of Uzbeks live below the 
poverty line and the social inequality is growing.304 As a result, the large numbers of 
Uzbeks, together with the other Central Asian nations, moved abroad (mainly to Russia) 
as labor emigrants. The Human Development Index (HDI), which comprises indicators 
related to public health, education, and living standards in the country, for Uzbekistan is 
0.641 and gives the 115 position among the 187 countries.305 It is higher than these of 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and during the last 6 years improved by 5 per cent, but it is 
much lower than that of Kazakhstan. After the collapse of the USSR, Uzbekistan retained 
the most developed infrastructure in Central Asia. However, the growing lack of 
specialists, shortage of funds for maintenance and investment, and unbridled corruption 
in two decades turned this initial advantage into decay and decline of social services.306 
Another specific feature of Uzbek socio-economic life is forced or compulsory 
labor. The latter is also inherited from the USSR where such labor was quite common 
practice to support the Soviet agricultural sector with the largely free labor force of 
governmental employees and students. Despite the prohibition of forced or compulsory 
labor in Uzbek Constitution and other legislation and the official governmental 
declarations about its intentions to enforce these laws at least in relation to children, the 
actual situation is not improving. School children, college students, teachers, medical 
personnel, and many other governmental employees are forced to pick cotton in the field 
for months and while living in the unsanitary and slavery conditions.307 While the 
Western governments, as usually, avoid putting too much pressure on Karimov, more 
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than 100 internationally famous apparel companies responded to the call of the Uzbek 
civil society activists and declared a boycott for the Uzbek cotton.308 The ongoing 
modern slavery in Uzbekistan further undermines the rule of law and makes this 
population feeling helpless against the Karimov’s regime. 
Although the huge law enforcement apparatus and its unrestricted practices keep 
the general level of delinquency low, the level of organized crime remains high and has 
very negative impact on the overall social situation in Uzbekistan. The existing poor 
economic conditions, pervasive corruption, and weak rule of law make the criminal path 
much more attractive to the large young population that suffers from unemployment and 
unclear prospects for their future. According to the Jane’s report of 2010, “in addition to 
numerous smaller client gangs and allies, there are a handful of large criminal groups 
involved in the illicit trade of cotton and narcotics.”309 The latter trafficking is related to 
the geographical position of Uzbekistan, the same as of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakhstan, to Afghanistan that remains the main producer of illegal drugs in the region. 
Apart from worsening the national criminal situation and increasing the numbers of drug 
abusers, the drug trafficking causes an alarming increase (from 2000 to 2008 the increase 
was 11-fold) of HIV/AIDS infections.310 Considering the ongoing decline of social 
services and the public health care in particular, such trends may have significant impact 
on the overall social situation in Uzbekistan. 
Despite quite problematic economic and social situation in the country, 
Karimov’s regime does not seem really worried and capable of improvement. Since there 
is no meaningful secular opposition in Uzbekistan, he undermines political Islamism as 
irrelevant to the solutions of these problems as well. Although admitting “that upheavals 
of religious fanaticism are not originated only and exclusively by religious contradictions 
in themselves, but predominantly are originated due to unsolved social, political and 
economic problems,” Karimov firmly states that religion alone “is not able to make any 
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recommendations on the settlement of social and economic problems.”311 He understands 
that it’s crucial for the regime to increase the living conditions for the ordinary people. 
On the other hand, it is obvious that the same regime due to the overwhelming corruption 
is not capable to significantly improve them despite the considerable natural resources.312 
Furthermore, Karimov cannot exploit the Western potential for economic aid due to the 
lack of improvement of his record on human rights, democracy, economic liberalization, 
and rule of law. Most probably, Karimov “will therefore give them [people] something—
perhaps better welfare policies—so as to defuse social tensions and unhappiness, since he 
will need to secure people’s trust and support.”313 According to well-known expert on 
Central Asia Ahmed Rashid: 
“[Karimov] like all the other Central Asian leaders, […] has become 
increasingly isolated from the public and from political activity over the 
years, surrounding himself with openly corrupt sycophants. Like them, he 
has become increasingly unable to find solutions to his country’s 
overwhelming problems because he refuses to recognize their sources.”314  
Such remoteness from the real problems in the society and inability to address the reasons 
for them properly was characteristic to the Soviet governments that increasingly resorted 
to force in order to appease the population. In that respect, Karimov is following exactly 
the same path. The real fight against corruption is also unacceptable, for that would 
destroy the very foundations of his regime in Uzbekistan. To sustain his rule, Karimov 
can rely only on the repressive law enforcement organization and the Soviet-style 
propaganda. The general population, on the other hand, must find its way into the future 
by critically assessing the current situation and making own judgments based on its own 
experiences with the national political, economic, and social situation and the uncensored 
information available. 
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3. Analysis of Public Opinion  
Since public opinions about any area of public life or governmental policy is 
influenced by the other areas and policies, the analysis of public opinion in Uzbekistan 
has to be well-structured in order to draw conclusions related to the CT policies. 
Although public opinions often are formed without sufficient knowledge and based on 
the individual experiences and perceptions, it is the most direct expression of the content 
and direction of Uzbek public support in the framework of CT (Fig. 4). In respect to the 
Islamic terrorists, Uzbek public support can be divided into two parts: support of Islamic 
political goals and legitimacy of violence. While the religiosity of the local population, 
discontent with the current regime, and personal feelings of relative deprivation could 
make the political Islamism as an attractive alternative to the current Karimov’s regime, 
the unjust use of force by the government and personal grievances inflicted by the latter 
can make people supportive of terrorist violence. Terrorists, in general, try to enhance 
such popular preferences by providing social help and physical protection to the people; 
make their attacks visible, provocative and targeted against the worst governmental 
officials; spread their ideology; and recruit the discontent people either into violent 
groups or a peaceful political opposition. In order to be able to do all that, on the other 
hand, terrorists must have adequate resources and safe havens, demonstrate ideological 
and organizational homogeneity, and maintain networks with the similar organizations. 
In respect to the government, the popular support consists of the perception of 
legitimacy of the governmental actions against terrorists and the general support to the 
governmental policies. Both are quite complex phenomena. Firstly, the legitimacy 
depends on how proportional and just, in the eyes of the population, is the governmental 
use of force against terrorists and how it affects that population itself. The proportionality 
partially depends on how the people assess the terrorist threat towards themselves. 
Secondly, the rule of law is determined not only within the CT framework but also within 
the other areas of the public life. 
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Figure 4.   Framework of influence on public opinion on counterterrorism. 
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If the actual political, economic, and social governmental policies are perceived 
by the population as just and efficient, the general support to the government is almost 
granted. On the contrary, if people feel deprived and suppressed, this support is weak. In 
order to gain the public support, governments should maintain democratic regime, respect 
human and civil rights and freedoms, maintain favorable economic conditions and social 
justice, and assure the rule of law. 
 In respect to the Islamic terrorism, the propagation of moderate Islam is 
necessary in order to make people immune to the manipulation with the radical Islamic 
ideas and legitimacy of violence. Unfortunately not all of these complexities are directly 
addressed in the available polls. Due to the inconsistency and variety of the existing polls 
of the Uzbek public opinion, their analysis must be carefully interpreted in order to 
provide consistent and reliable conclusions. In addition, due to the repressive nature of 
the current political regime in Uzbekistan, the reliability of the polls’ results also needs 
consideration. For example, the 2012 polls conducted by the national agency Ijtimoyi 
Fikr315 show that more than 90 per cent of the population are satisfied with the 
socioeconomic and security situation and 87 per cent see that respect to human rights has 
increased. While the whole rhetoric in the publications and reports of that agency is full 
of Soviet style praising of Karimov and his government, there is no access to the full 
reports and methodologies used in the respective researches.  
The widest in scope and details is the poll316 by Steven Wagner of 1996. It 
provides a good picture about the situation in Uzbekistan when independence was still a 
new concept for the people who eagerly expressed their views about the domestic 
changes. The Pew research317 of 2002 includes Uzbekistan among the other 44 states and 
focuses public opinions on more global issues; yet, it includes direct questions about 
terrorism. The two world polls from Gallup318 give global overviews (2010 and 2011) on 
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the question of general wellbeing and hope. On the other hand, they give an opportunity 
to assess the potential for the general public support to the respective governments and 
compare with the results in other states. The Gallup’s research on views of violence319 in 
2011 indicates the level of public support to the governmental use of force against 
terrorists and general population. The most up to date public responses to the specific 
questions about the existing socio-economic conditions are available on the Gallup’s 
website.320 The similar polls, which are wider discussed in the next chapter, were 
conducted also in the other Central Asian states. Considering significant political, 
economic, and social similarities among these countries, the comparison of the results is 
rather useful in avoiding wrong interpretations and providing sounder basis for 
conclusions. However, sometimes certain differences in time, scope, and format of these 
polls make their comparison difficult. Therefore, certain assumptions and interpretation 
are unavoidable in order to determine the actual public support in Uzbekistan. The 
following summary of the public support in Uzbekistan is based on the above-mentioned 
polls and interpreted on the background of the earlier-presented material and on the 
personal experiences in Uzbekistan in 1988 and in Lithuania during the early post-Soviet 
period from 1990. 
In general, despite the apparent political suppression, economic hardship, social 
decline, and violation of human rights, the majority of Uzbek population remains 
supportive to its government. Karimov’s regime so far succeeded to impose its views on 
democracy and strong, even authoritarian when necessary, government on the local 
population. The Soviet political system was rapidly changed by the national dictatorship 
and gave no opportunity for the nation to experience real democratic system in practice. 
Therefore, while most of the respondents largely assessed Uzbekistan as democratic state, 
the open criticism of government they still considered unacceptable and often preferred 
just a one-party political system. However, the percentage of such respondents is 
gradually decreasing and more people tend to realize the limitations of the current 
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political system. Despite the realization that the local media is controlled by the 
government, the trust in the public media remains rather high. The significant portion of 
the latter consists of the Russian media. Furthermore, the most admirable and trustful 
institution remains the presidential office. The Oliy Majlis is significantly less trusted 
and, according to the majority opinion, should be subordinated to the President. A strong 
Western and secular orientation, in contrast to the Islamic, was demonstrated in the 
popular selections of the models for economic and political developments. In parallel, 
Uzbeks are very supportive of the U.S. war on terror, foreign policies, and economic 
activities in Uzbekistan. The American way of life, however, is significantly less 
appreciated. However, after 15 years the considerable majority of the population prefers 
rapprochement with Russia even at the expense of the relations with the U.S.321 
The major sources of discontent and problems for the population remain 
economic and social conditions, such as personal incomes, growing prices, 
unemployment, worsening social services, environmental pollution, etc. On the top of the 
national problems are threat of terrorism and spread of AIDS and other infectious 
diseases. The Islamic terrorism and suicide bombing in particular is strongly condemned. 
They are followed by the concerns about growing crime, worsening social and 
environmental conditions, large corruption, and emigration. Similarly, the governmental 
policies in the area of public security are seen as insufficient and obstructed by corruption 
in the law enforcement. Although through the last twenty years the initially high trust in 
the latter significantly decreased, it still remains rather moderate. The highest scores for 
public trust hold the military and government, followed by the news media and clergy. 
Despite some decrease in the satisfaction on the individual conditions, the views on the 
national general conditions are rated quite high and the general reliance on the 
government for improvement remains strong. In essence, Uzbekistan’s population can be 
considered as very optimistic both regionally and globally. 
In terms of human rights and freedoms, Uzbeks are not much concerned and do 
not see radical Islamism as a viable political alternative. In the late 1990s, the majority of 
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respondents considered that respect to human rights increased after the declaration of 
independence. Although gradually declining, the popular opinion about the respect to 
human rights in Uzbekistan is still rather high, considering the actual situation. In respect 
to religion, many respondents pointed to the increased freedom on religion in comparison 
with the Soviet period and the limited role of it in the modern world. On the contrary, 
Uzbekistan’s people are somehow supportive to the limitations on human rights and use 
of force by the government in case of social disturbances or other major threats to the 
state. Furthermore, they never named repressions of religion or violations of human rights 
even among the ten most important public concerns, which remain dominated by the 
economic and social problems. 
Such a disparity between the actual conditions in the country and the remaining 
trust and support to the government can be explained by the Soviet past, repressive 
regime, and strong pro-governmental control of information. The population compliantly 
suffers, because it does not have experiences of the really democratic and non-repressive 
political regime. In comparison with the Baltic republics that also regained independence 
after the collapse of the USSR, the difference in measuring322 the level of popular 
satisfaction and corresponding support to their governments is obvious due to the 
different political, social, and economic experiences during the last twenty years. 
Nevertheless, it would be risky to conclude that there is no potential for a massive 
insurgency in the future. Firstly, the people are used from the Soviet times to keep their 
real opinion hidden from anybody: be it a stranger, a governmental official, or foreign 
researcher. The current practices of Uzbek law enforcement did not encourage people to 
express their opinions openly under any circumstances. The Western representatives 
cannot eliminate that fear due to the disappointingly appeasing position of the major 
Western powers towards Karimov. Secondly, the rapidly growing young Uzbek 
population does not have Soviet habits and despite strict censorship has much wider 
access to the information from abroad. In addition, the high level of unemployment 
among them and very limited religious education can make them susceptible to the 
radical Islamist ideas and violence. Thirdly, the actual regional dislocation of the 
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population in terms of their religiosity, discontent, and activism was not precisely 
considered. While the 11.3 million population of the Fergana valley, which always was a 
hotbed of the public discontent and Islamism, represents 40 per cent of the total 
population, in the polls it represented at most up to 25 per cent of the respondents. The 
influence of the governmental censorship and propaganda cannot be ignored as well. 
Therefore, the actual public discontent might be higher and the preferences more radical. 
Nevertheless, popular Uzbek views on religion and rejection of the Islamic 
terrorism clearly indicate that Islamism did not get higher preferences among 
Uzbekistan’s population even after twenty years. The strict control of religious affairs, 
education, and official propaganda allows Karimov to keep Uzbek population rather 
secular, patient, and even more supportive than the other Central Asian nations. The 
failure of his regime to improve economic and social situation in the country, on the other 
hand, causes growing public discontent. In combination with the harsh and indiscriminate 
governmental repressions, growing social inequality, and corruption, the situation in 
Uzbekistan becomes more similar to the North African or Middle Eastern situations that 
sparked massive insurgencies and brought Islamists into power. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The harsh and decisive Uzbekistan’s strategy towards Islamism keeps Islamic 
militants in exile and non-violent Islamists suppressed from becoming a force capable to 
really challenge the current regime. The straightforward and uncompromising CT 
strategy, supporting exhaustive legislation, strict control of religion, and unity of 
command over the related governmental entities provides an effective framework for the 
CT policies. Furthermore, the state has incomparably larger resources—law enforcement, 
armed forces, secret services, entities controlling religion, public education, media, and 
propaganda—directed not only for reaction to terrorist activities but also to prevent the 
very appearance of the Islamic opposition and insurgency in the country.  
The actual implementation of the CT policies, however, largely violates human 
rights, international norms, and even the national legislation. Although the latter provides 
sufficient basis for the rule of law, respect to human rights, and compliance with the 
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international commitments of Uzbekistan on legal norms, its vagueness  and the official 
support to the law enforcement’s abuses made the actual implementation of the CT and 
religion policies exceedingly harsher. It involved much wider population and 
disproportionally high punishments than it was necessary just to contain the threat of 
terrorism. In general, the religious activities in Uzbekistan are also highly criminalized. 
In addition, the high level of corruption in the law enforcement structures, as in the all 
other areas of public life in Uzbekistan, made the related persecution a source for abuse 
by the corrupt officials and completely undermined the rule of law in the country. 
Furthermore, Karimov employs the same resources and policies also against every 
possible political opposition and public discontent in order to keep his regime in power. 
As a result, rough violations of human and civil rights and freedoms became an everyday 
reality in Uzbekistan. In the independent assessments, Uzbekistan rates very low in terms 
of democracy, respect to human and civil rights and freedoms, independent media, and 
rule of law. Internationally this country is infamous for its autocratic regime, tortures, 
abuses, and control of public information. From the 48 countries internationally 
considered as not free, Uzbekistan is among the worst, such as North Korea, 
Turkmenistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, and Syria.323 
The economic and social situation in Uzbekistan is worsening despite the large 
natural resources and existing potential. Due to the favorable international market for 
natural resources, Uzbekistan’s macroeconomic indicators are rather high. However, the 
prevailing governmental control over the national economy, restrictions on private 
businesses and pervasive corruption deny the proper distribution of the national incomes 
to the whole population. Due to the lack of specialists and investments, the decay of the 
infrastructure and decline of the social services are continuously increasing. The high 
level of unemployment, especially among the rural young population, and compulsory or 
forced labor further worsen the social situation and cause growth of the organized crime.  
Nevertheless, Uzbek population mostly remains supportive to their government. 
Despite the political limitations, economic hardship, and social decay that make 
                                                 
323. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprising and Their Global 
Repercussions, by Arch Puddington (2012), 5. 
 79
individual life satisfaction level decreasing, the nation considers the overall national 
situation as satisfactory and trusts the existing regime as being able to improve situation 
in Uzbekistan. It also remains largely secular and condemns Islamic terrorism. Neither of 
the previously analyzed Islamist organizations (IMU, IJU, HT) has visible influence on 
the Uzbek population and cannot expect improvement in the foreseeable future. In the 
current environment, the formation of capable opposition is unlikely in the short to 
middle term period. Nevertheless, the worsening domestic situation and inability of the 
current regime to properly address the reasons of the existing problems and start solving 
them make Uzbekistan’s situation similar to the Arab Spring’s preconditions. Another 
trigger for major disturbances can be the inevitable succession of power after Karimov, 
when the current corrupt groups within the government (the law enforcement in 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE ON UZBEKISTAN’S 
COUNTERTERRORIST POLICIES (1990 – 2012) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the contemporary proliferation of Islamism and related terrorism in many 
countries worldwide and the interests of the major foreign powers in the region, 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies not only became a subject for various international reactions, 
but also themselves made an impact on the neighboring countries. Due to the difference 
in time, scope, and intensity, the experience of Islamism in the other post-Soviet Central 
Asian states caused different policies for dealing with this threat. The international nature 
of Islamism and related terrorism forced these states to interact closer for a common 
security and stability by exchanging information, experiences, support, and consequently 
influencing policies for dealing with Islamism among them. Following the ambitions and 
certain potential for regional dominance,324 Karimov often intruded his CT policies as the 
example for the neighbors to follow.   
On the broader international arena, Uzbekistan differs from its neighbors by 
exercising “a proactive and independent foreign policy … in its relations with … great 
powers.”325 Karimov sustains his initial orientation towards the U.S., the EU, Russia, and 
East and South-East Asia326 through foreign policies and economic relations327 but avoids 
becoming dependent on any of them. The latter strategy may become counterproductive 
with the recently growing Russian involvement in the region. The relations with the 
Muslim countries in Northern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia remain limited.  
The most significant developments of Islamism in these regions, however, caused 
reactions worldwide and could not be totally ignored by Uzbekistan as well. The religious 
state’s political leaderships formed by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, the 
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Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in Pakistan, and the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) 
in Turkey, after receiving the wide popular mandate, tried to turn their countries into 
Islamic states. The resulted political changes are seriously considered by the secular 
political leaders and the opposing Islamists worldwide.  
Whatever the state’s initial strategy for dealing with Islamism, it develops also 
through international relations, dynamics of global security, and related international 
events. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze what was the international 
influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies and what was the impact of these policies on 
the neighboring countries facing the threat of Islamic terrorism. Firstly, this analysis is 
focused within the nearest, geographically and historically, neighborhood—Central Asia. 
Due to the most active radical Islamism, the main attention is given to the relations with 
Tajikistan. In contrast, due to the isolated and neutral nature of Turkmenistan, this part is 
limited by the scarcity of bilateral relations. The wider international influence is 
presented through the Uzbekistan’s relations with the U.S., Russia, the EU, and China, as 
the main foreign powers in the region and the evaluation of the possible impact from the 
recent developments of political Islamism abroad.  
B. UZBEKISTAN’S CT COOPERATION WITH THE CENTRAL ASIAN 
STATES 
1. Uzbekistan’s Approach to the Regional CT Cooperation 
The spreading threat of Islamic terrorism in Uzbekistan is used not only for 
persecution of the expelled terrorists and political Islamic opposition but also exploited 
for promotion of its dominance and the hardline CT policies throughout the region. Due 
to the geographical and ethnic differences, the Central Asian states faced threats of 
radical Islamism different in time and scope. Consequently, their responses varied and 
also were conditioned by their political and economic capabilities. Similarly, 
Uzbekistan’s approach differed depending on the political, military, and economic 
strength of each country. It is possible to divide these relations into two categories: the 
one where Karimov communicated from the position of power and the other where he 
had to honor partners’ interests and strengths. Karimov’s behavior with the closest 
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neighbors, nevertheless, can be characterized as largely aggressive and manipulative, 
including even double playing his counterparts by negotiating with the Taliban.328  
Although the ideology of Islamism is quite alien to most of the local populations, 
the incompetence, corruption, and authoritarian rule of the current political authorities 
(often since independence still led by former Communists) left the people with no other 
alternatives. Due to the ability of the well-prepared Islamists to give radical answers to 
the desperate people, the Central Asian authorities consider the local Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) 
even more dangerous to the current regimes than Islamic terrorists. The weakest Central 
Asian states—Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—from the very beginning of their independence 
also faced the strongest threat of Islamic terrorism and pressure from Uzbekistan. The 
similar approach, however, was not feasible in respect to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
And yet, initially the threat of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and later of 
the HT as well forced the Central Asian states to collaborate against the common threat. 
Although Uzbekistan in the area of security is a member of many international 
organizations—Conference for Interaction and Confidence in Asia (CICA), Central Asia 
Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), United Nations (UN), 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NATO Partnership for Peace (NATO PfP), 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—he prefers biliateral 
relations both with the closest neighbors and the foreign regional powers. 
2. Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Tajikistan 
Despite the many commonalities in threat of Islamic terrorism, Uzbekistan’s 
interaction with Tajikistan can be characterized as largely unfriendly and imbalanced in 
terms of influence on each other. In the USSR, Tajikistan was the most religious Central 
Asian republic with the linguistic and cultural ties to Iran and Afghanistan. Hence, it was 
more susceptible than Uzbekistan to the influx of the radical Islamist during the Soviet 
war in Afghanistan, when the foreign intelligence agencies tried to spread Jihad to the 
USSR’s territory. Later, Tajikistan was more than the other Central Asian states 
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influenced  by the Iranian Islamic revolution and got large support from this country, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey.329 Tajikistan’s geographical position and military 
weakness conditioned the large flows of drug trafficking330 and the IMU’s activities.  
 
Figure 5.   Number of terrorist attacks in Tajikistan (1992–2012).331  
Although from 1990 Tajikistan was the only Central Asian state with the official 
Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the political discrimination of the latter, 
growing socio-economic problems and clan competitions for influence led to the civil 
war of 1992–1997. Tajikistan was unable to cope without international military and 
political support. The IRPT was a major part of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). 
Despite intitial popular support, the IRPT could not overcome regional and ethnic 
divisions to mobilize massive insurgency.332 Nevertheless, the Tajik authorities had to 
negotiate with the Islamic opposition, declare amnesty, and allocate them 30% of the 
governmental positions in order to end this war.333 
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The Uzbekistan’s participation in this war allowed Karimov continuing pressure 
on Tajikistan. During the civil war, Uzbekistan supported the official government with its 
military by joining the CIS and the UN peacekeeping forces. 334 The primary interest of 
Karimov was to stop proliferation of this conflict to Uzbekistan and continue persecution 
of the expelled Uzbek Islamic militants. Despite the viable possibility to annex Khojand 
from Tajikistan, Karimov did not exploit the sizeable Uzbek minorities in Tajikistan but 
prefered support for the Tajik government composed of the former Communist elite.335 
The political compromise of 1997 with the IRPT, however, was considered by Karimov 
as a sign of Tajikistan’s weakness and lack of decisiveness in dealing with Islamism. He 
continued criticizing the Tajik government for its liberalism towards Islamism and 
demanding harder CT policies and control of borders.336 The economic and political 
sanctions, which were often used by Karimov for this purpose, however, contributed to 
the rise of ethnic insurgence against the Uzbek minority (23%) in Tajikistan.337 Tajik 
President Imomali Rahmon gradually strenghthened anti-Islamic measures and even 
made his country equal to Uzbekistan in violations of religious freedom and restrictions 
on democracy.338 Although the bombings of 2005–2007 can be considered as the outburst 
of Islamic terrorism in response to such policies, some experts speculated that these acts 
could be organized by his government itself to justify continuation of the repressive rule 
in Tajikistan.339 The delays with the full implementation of the 1997 agreements, growing 
attempts to deny Islamist’s influence by the Tajik government, and conflicts between 
clans, however, provoked new armed insurgencies in August 2012.340  
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The bilateral relations between these two countries remain tense and not suitable 
for exerting influence on each other. Still there are several unresolved issues: territorial 
and border disputes, the Tajikistan’s dependence on the gas import from Uzbekistan, and 
the drug trafficking and the IMU’s activities in the border areas.341 Uzbekistan exploits 
the Tajik political, economic, ethnic, and military weaknesses by intrusive and pressing 
behavior towards its neighbor. Although in the early 2000s Karimov attempted to exploit 
the expelled Tajik opposition and ethnic Uzbek refugees against the Tajik government,342 
latter he switched to employing economic sanctions (e.g., cut of gas exports in 2006) and 
even threatening with a war.343 Tajikistan as a transit country for drug trafficking and 
Islamic terrorists “is gradually becoming part of the virtual jihad”344 and a source of 
insecurity in Central Asia. It cannot influence Uzbekistan in any other way as to 
cooperate under the latter’s leadership. On the other hand, the renewed Russian military 
and economic commitments in the region allow Tajikistan to ignore Karimov’s menace 
and achieve more equal partnership. 
3. Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Kyrgyzstan 
Due to the political and economic weakness, Kyrgyzstan was dependent on 
international support and subjected to Uzbekistan’s enforcement. The Fergana valley—
the furnace of Islamism in Central Asia—was the main area where the interests of all 
three countries interlaced. One of the IMU leaders, Juma Namangani, skillfully used 
terroristic attacks among the awkwardly divided borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan to play off the three governments and make them unable to cooperate.345 The 
inability to cooperate also was a major obstacle towards a better border control.346 In 
addition, Karimov preferred to talk with its neighbors from the superior position and was 
largely reluctant to participate in any multilateral organizations.  
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Figure 6.   Number of terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan (1992–2012).347  
Kyrgyzstan, similarly as Tajikistan, could not exercise any influence on 
Uzbekistan but gradually followed its CT policies. Although Kyrgyzstan always has been 
very active in international CT cooperation, including not only regional neighbors but 
also wider international participation,348 its authorities often were criticized by Karimov 
of being too soft towards Islamic radicals and accused of harboring the IMU’s 
militants.349 Being the only Central Asian democratic country, which in 2011 held the 
first peaceful and democratic transfer of power, Kyrgyzstan could not manipulate its 
national legislation and force structures as easily as Karimov. Nevertheless, the country 
after 2005 significantly intensified its CT activities.350 Although the armed clashes in the 
border area between the drug traffickers (possibly also the IMU) and the security forces 
from both countries caused many biliateral disaggreements and accusations, the CT 
between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan significantly improved.351  
The democratic regime of Kyrgyzstan suffered not only from the internal conflicts 
but also from the domestic and foreign Uzbek pressure. The HT members are primarily 
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located among the Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan’s southern part but also spreading to 
the northern one.352 The growing socio-economic problems and violent ethnic conflicts 
are still persistant. Due to the lack of security, the Uzbek minorities would even welcome 
the IMU or the IJU as their defenders.353 The Tajik government’s attempts to suppress 
ethnic clashes with the increasingly harsh anti-Uzbek policies result in growing 
radicalization that materializes in the increasing recruitment into the HT or even the 
IMU.354 Similarly as in Tajikistan, despite the obvious Karimov’s ambitions for the 
regional dominance and the accusations from Kyrgyz authorities, there is no evidence 
that he support the Uzbek minorities in any substantial manner. Although Uzbekistan did 
not hesitate even to violate Kyrgyzstan’s territorial sovereignty in pursue of the Uzbek 
terrorists in 1999, the actual behavior of the official Tashkent indicates its strong 
preference for stability in the region against the possible territorial gains or weakening of 
the neighboring governments. Still, the economic and military leverages of Uzbekistan 
have been employed against Kyrgyzstan. The latter, however, currently chose the Russian 
support to be able to withstand that pressure by accepting the Russian military presence 
and investments.355 
4. Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Kazakhstan 
Despite the relatively stable economic situation and initially democratic regime, 
faced with the increasing threat of Islamic terrorism Kazakhstan turned towards the 
hardening of its CT policies. This country faced the Islamic terrorism a decade later than 
its neighbors. Some of the terrorist attacks in the early 1990s were attributed to the 
Chechen rebel groups that were driven by separatism from Russia, often resorted to the 
criminal rampage, and adopted the ideology of Islamism only in the late 1990s.356 The 
other terroristic incidents until 2000 remain without clear suspects. The low religiosity 
                                                 
352. U.S. DoS, Country reports on terrorism 2005: Kyrgyzstan, 108. 
353. ICG, The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Report No.193 (2010), 23. 
354. ICG, Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South, Asia Report No.222 (2012), 12–14. 
355. “Kyrgyzstan Hosts Putin to Ink Defense, Energy, Debt Deals,” Eurasianet, September 20, 2012. 
356. ICG, The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (I), Ethnicity and Conflict, Report 
No.220 (2012), 13. 
 89
and good socio-economic situation made it look immune357 to radical Islamism. 
Furthermore, Karimov could not apply any threat against the strong and stable neighbor. 
The religious terrorism in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, however, caused the prohibition of 
religious parties in the Kazakh Constitution of 1995.358 Although the large Russian-
speaking population, close affiliation with Russia, and limited influence of the 
geographically dispersed ethnic Kazakhs make Kazakhstan less susceptible to Islamism, 
the authoritarian leadership took the threat of Islamic extremism seriously and its anti-
Islamic policies increasingly hardened. 
 
Figure 7.   Number of terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan (1992–2012).359  
Uzbekistan was never able to exercise pressure on Kazakhstan but the latter 
developed close cooperation and often expressed support to Karimov’s policies.360 
Despite being strong enough to ignore the latter’s pressure, Kazakhstan’s President still 
was criticized by Karimov for being inadequately soft in respect to Islamic radicals.361 
Nevertheless, even when the Uzbek CT policies forced the influx of the Uzbek refugees, 
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who joined the already numerous Uzbek minorities in Kazakhstan and contributed to the 
spread of the HT there,362 the Kazakh authorities never expressed disagreement or 
condemnation to Uzbekistan. Furthermore, emphasizing the value of the CT cooperation 
within the SCO, the foreign minister of Kazakhstan proudly announced that a 100 
attempts of terrorist acts were precluded only in 2009.363 Such Kazakhstan’s position is 
similar to Karimov’s position towards Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It indicates the 
solidarity of the former Communists who still share the same Soviet-type values and 
approaches in domestic and foreign politics. 
5. Uzbekistan’s CT Cooperation with Turkmenistan 
The political nature of Turkmenistan makes international influence on 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies or vice versa highly unlikely. The level of authoritarianism in 
the Turkmen domestic politics made this state “the most repressive and dictatorial in the 
region.”364 The cult of personality of President Saparmurad Niyazov was also employed 
for the spiritual life of Turkmens by enforcing on them a spiritual code of conduct, 
written by the President, as a substitute  for the Bible and the Quran. Yet, the suppressive 
and dictatorial regime alone cannot explain the almost total absence of Islamic terrorism 
in Turkmenistan. The main factors that make the situation in this country different are: 
the predominance of tribalism and ethnic allegiances, plurality and traditionalism of the 
local Islam, geographical obstacles from Afghanistan, and forced conscription.365 The 
assassination attempt on President Niyazov in 2002, however, triggered many harsh CT 
measures similar to Uzbekistan’s. Currently, Turkmenistan remains on the same path: 
continuously develops CT capabilities, and participates in the related international 
cooperation.366 Although President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov removed a number of 
the eccentric bans and dismantled the cult of personality of his predecessor, there are no 
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indications that he is going to make Turkmenistan more democratic and increase respect 
for human rights. In that respect, it remains similar to Uzbekistan. Furthermore, due to 
the weak relations and the hard Karimov’s stance, there are no favorable conditions for a 
closer cooperation and influence among these two countries.  
6. Commonality of Political and Popular Preferences in Central Asia  
The current autocratic and corrupt Central Asian regimes are not willing and able 
to stop the obvious decay of the socio-economic situation and the rapid deterioration of 
the infrastructure and social services, the gradual disappearance of which gives new life 
to radical Islamism. There remains an obvious common interest among these leaders, 
many of whom share the same Communist background, to avoid color revolutions and 
support each other from being overthrown by the Islamist, nationalist, liberalist, or any 
other opposition. Since terrorist activities in the region are diminishing (Fig. 8), the 
Central Asian regimes are concentrating against the non-violent HT and pro-democratic 
political opposition that have more potential to gain popular support than militants. The 
maintenance of the external threat was characteristic to the USSR in keeping its 
population under the strong propaganda and control. Similarly, for the Central Asian 
regimes the threat of Islamism, real or inflated, is useful for justifying compromises with 
human rights, democracy, and liberal economy. 
The convergence of the CT policies among the Central Asian states, however, 
cannot be attributed only to the commonality of personal interests of the regional 
autocrats, because there is a significant popular support for such policies. The existing 
studies of the Central Asian population’s opinions367 mostly correspond with the Uzbek 
ones and give valuable information for deeper understanding about the local milieu in 
respect to the authoritarian regimes and radical Islamism. 
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Figure 8.   Number of terrorist attacks in Central Asia (1998 – 2012).368  
Despite the persistent economic hardship, growing social inequality and poverty, 
dominance of the repressive and corrupt secular leaderships, lack of democracy and 
liberal economic reforms, and continuous violations of human rights, the Central Asian 
populations do not see Islamism as a viable alternative to the current regimes but rather 
as one of the most serious threats to their security. Although Tajiks, Kyrgyzstanis, and 
Kazakhs are significantly more critical of their governments than Uzbeks, according to 
the polls of public opinion, among the most important problems they do not see a lack of 
religious freedom or violation of human rights in their states. Socio-economic problems 
are on the top in these lists. Another important popular preference—justification of 
governmental violence—is also rated high and not related to religious affiliation.369  The 
general popular support for limiting civil rights or even establishing dictatorship in case 
of social unrest are high enough for the governments to continue with the hardline 
strategies against Islamism. 
Although the IRPT case may suggest that the threat of radical Islamism could be 
dealt with a less suppressive approach, the dynamic of the terrorist attacks shows the 
opposite trend. The potential of the legitimization of the IRPT was not fully exploited by 
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the Central Asian regimes. Tajikistan represented a different model of dealing with 
Islamism in a democratic way. Without strong international support that was urged by 
some international non-governmental organizations (e.g. IFES),370 however, this country 
could not spread it through the region and even sustain its democratic direction 
domestically. The political IRPT’s activities, in general, were more beneficial to the 
secular government than to the Islamists. After few years, this party suffered from 
decreasing popular support; due to the dissociation from the Taliban, it lost foreign 
financial support; did not achieve noticable results but was useful by opposing other 
Islamists (e.g., the HT) that could become serious competitors to the IRPT.371  One could 
argue that the Central Asian states in the early 1990s missed an opportunity to 
significantly lessen the future threat of radical Islamism by refusing legitimization in 
whole Central Asia372 of the all-Soviet IRP that was following democratic principles. On 
the other hand, the numbers and scope of terrorist attacks tend to remain stable or even 
increase in the countries that initially (roughly till the mid-1990s) were more democratic, 
mostly liberal on  religion, and significantly less repressive against political opposition. 
Furthermore, Tajikistan suffered most despite the political compromise with the UTO and 
inclusion of the Islamists in the government. On the contrary, Uzbekistan with the most 
repressive CT and religious policies has less terrorist attacks. 
C. WIDER FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON UZBEKISTAN’S CT POLICIES 
1. Official and Popular Uzbek Preferences in International Relations 
The official and popular Uzbek preferences in the area of international relations 
largely remain congruent in their directions and evolution. While the official foreign 
policy clearly favored orientation towards the Western democracies and Russia, it 
showed less interest in the South and South-east Asian countries and barely even 
mentioned other Muslim countries, except for the closest ex-Soviet neighbors.373 
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Although Uzbekistan’s membership in international organizations was also strongly 
emphasized374 and often followed, the regional cooperation was tense and unstable due to 
the hegemonic Karimov’s ambitions and diplomatic practices. While relations with the 
foreign regional powers he treated with the certain respect, his rough behavior with the 
representations of international organizations in Uzbekistan, especially non-governmental 
ones, demonstrated total negligence of international norms, human rights, and 
democracy. Karimov usually preferred bilateral and opportunistic relations to the 
multilateral approach. After two decades of his manipulations and occasional major shifts 
in relations with the foreign regional powers, Uzbekistan is getting closer to Russia and, 
to some extent, China. 
The popular preferences for international relations corresponded with the official 
ones initially and followed the same direction towards Russia. While in 1996, the Uzbek 
population strongly favored the U.S. and Germany as models for both political and 
economic developments, the Muslim countries were at the end of the list with just few 
percent of admirers.375 The exceptional among the Muslim countries position of Turkey, 
which followed right after the U.S. and Germany, could be explained by her politico-
economic strength and international role but not association with Islam. Such a popular 
opinion about the general backwardness of the foreign Muslim countries still echoes with 
a very blunt and critical view expressed by the Soviet Central Asian refugees: 
 “Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the 
Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and 
ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, 
though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people 
in facing life.”376 
Naturally, the Uzbek support to the governmental and the U.S. war on terror 
contrasts with the popular opinions in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, and 
most of the other Muslim countries. The similar public opinion in the other Central Asian 
states strengthens the homogeneity of the regional approach too. The concurrence 
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between the popular and official preferences in foreign affairs provides a sound 
foundation for Uzbekistan’s international CT cooperation.  
The wider international influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies can be divided 
into two categories: the direct influence from the foreign powers through a variety of 
political and economic measures and the indirect one that arises from the major 
achievements of political Islamism abroad. The internal Uzbekistan’s policies, especially 
those directly related to the domestic stability and security (e.g. CT policies), inevitably 
became a subject of concern for the foreign regional players who, despite their conflicting 
economic interests, share the common objective of the secure Central Asia. Similarly to 
its neighbors, Uzbekistan attracts attention of the foreign powers due to its natural and 
other resources but also due to its impact on the regional security. The strong 
Uzbekistan’s determination to fight Islamic terrorism inside and outside its borders 
perfectly corresponds to the global war on terror and security interests of the foreign 
powers in the region. Karimov’s policies related to democracy, human rights, economy, 
and the rule of law, on the other hand, only worsen Uzbekistan’s domestic situation and 
raise potential for insurgency that can be exploited by Islamic radicals. Considering 
security situations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, this can have a devastating effect for the 
whole region. The U.S., the EU, Russia, and China, therefore, tried to influence 
Uzbekistan’s domestic and international behavior by offering economic, political, or even 
military assistance through various international organizations and bilateral relations. Due 
to the more limited capabilities and the unfavorable Uzbekistan’s foreign priorities, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and other Muslim states have more difficulties to 
exercise their interests in this country. While the main foreign regional players remain 
Russia, the U.S., China, and the EU, the indirect influence from the Muslim countries can 
be conditioned by the developments of political Islamism in Turkey, Pakistan, and, most 
recently, in Northern Africa. The results from this indirect foreign influence depend how 
they are perceived by Uzbekistan’s regime, the Uzbek Islamic radicals, and also the 
above-mentioned foreign powers. 
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2. The U.S. Influence on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies 
Despite the active U.S. role in the region, the lack of long term interests in the 
region made its influence in Uzbekistan gradually declining. Although the Central Asian 
natural resources raised certain economic interests, the war in Afghanistan and strategic 
interest to limit Russia’s role in Central Asia led the U.S. involvement in the region. 
Karimov’s determination to limit the Russian influence in the region also was shared by 
the U.S. While the U.S. economic aid started from 1993, the assistance to the Uzbek 
security forces started from the late 1990s and was focused on non-lethal military 
equipment and training. In 2001 Uzbekistan became the first Central Asian country 
accepting the U.S. military presence, which gave Islamists additional reasons to condemn 
the anti-Islamic Karimov’s regime.  
President Bush’s administration, however, heavily underestimated how corrupt 
was Uzbekistan’s government and naively expected that the provision of additional 
military security and financial aid will make Karimov eager to start democratization and 
liberalization reforms. The latter, however, interpreted and exploited this support as a 
shield against domestic and international criticism towards his CT policies and even 
increased persecution of the Islamic and secular opposition. Furthermore, the U.S. 
economic and financial aid made little impact on the general Uzbek population’s 
wellbeing but became a source of wealth for his family, the closest partisans, and even 
organized crime.377 On the other hand, due to the Pentagon’s interests for military basing 
and transit and the CIA/FBI’s interests for cooperation with Uzbek intelligence, the U.S. 
posture was not always consistent and decisive enough.378 The latter interests made the 
repressive and non-discriminate Uzbekistan’s CT policies so much conducive to the U.S. 
military and intelligence that Karimov became completely immune towards any criticism 
in this area. Still, the U.S. continued criticizing the lack of democracy and violations of 
human rights, condemned the Andijan massacre in 2005, and stopped the financing of 
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military assistance.379  The following acceptance of the Uzbek political dissidents in the 
U.S. caused the Karimov’s decision to expel the American military from Uzbekistan.380  
The deterioration of the bilateral relations continued until 2009 when the U.S. war in 
Afghanistan needs once again took over the political interest for promotion of democracy 
and human rights.381  
Despite the improved diplomatic relations and the renewed military assistance 
from 2012,382 the U.S influence in Uzbekistan is decreasing. The U.S. reconciliation with 
the Uzbekistan’s domestic and foreign policies for the sake of improved bilateral 
relations was admitted on many diplomatic occasions.383 The renewed assistance in 
security, however, was based only on bilateral relations with the Central Asian states and 
focused on the protection of the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan without getting 
involved in solving deeper threats to the regional security. Although the U.S. still is 
highly interested to keep its military presence in the region even after the planned 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 and is a valuable source of economic aid, it seems 
Karimov understood the principle lack of the U.S. long term interests and its reluctance to 
assure the Uzbekistan’s security with a hard military support in case of armed conflicts in 
the region. While the U.S.’ attempts, although in a much modest manner, to promote 
democratic reforms and respect to human rights continues,384 it is highly unlikely to reach 
tangible results under the current regime. If the latter has made no improvements 
whatsoever in economic policies that force the U.S. companies, which invested in  
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Uzbekistan, to consider departing,385 the possibility of changing the in-humane CT 
policies is not realistic at all. The U.S. influence is decreasing also due to the renewed 
Russian activities in Central Asia. 
3. The European Influence on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies 
Although the U.S.-like approach and more limited capabilities, made the 
European influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies practically invisible, its regional 
approach made a significant contribution towards the closer cooperation among the 
Central Asian states. Although the European relations with Uzbekistan are exercised in 
two ways—through the EU and bilateral interactions—the lack of clear vision for the 
whole region and limited military capabilities crippled the European effectiveness in 
creating security in Central Asia. Due to the problematic nature of the EU as an 
organization, in terms of unity on foreign and security policy, slow decision making, and 
scarcity of military capabilities and reluctance to commit them abroad, the bilateral 
relations often took over. The normative intentions to spread democracy and respect to 
human rights have been often compromised due to the European energy and security 
interests. Such a dual stance made the EU look like a “hesitant vicar”386 in Central Asia.   
The EU, however, took a regional approach towards the Central Asian security 
and promoted regional cooperation through its projects (e.g. BOMCA—Border 
Management in Central Asia, INOGATE—Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe, 
TRACECA—Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia).387  Such a strategy clearly 
demonstrated the European ability to exercise its soft power388 in improving security 
abroad. Although the “Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia” from 2007 
improved the articulation of the strategic vision, the following financial and economic 
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crises from 2008 severely limited the EU’s resources for employing in this region.389 
Nevertheless, Uzbekistan remains an active participant of the OSCE’s (Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) programs related to CT. However, the principle 
European reluctance390 and to some extent inability to use military force in solving 
international issues, the European criticism cannot make any visible influence on the 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies. Sometimes this criticism, however, had dubious foundations 
(e.g., events in Andijan in 2005)391 and was definitely repulsive to President Karimov. 
Despite the initial wave of condemnation on the cruelty of Karimov’s regime, in 2009 the 
EU lifted her embargo on arms sales. 392 In addition to such a negative signal to the 
Uzbek and international defenders of human rights, European Commission President 
Emmanuel Barroso welcomed President Karimov in Brussels in 2011. Nevertheless, the 
dependency of the European leaders on popular votes and the necessity to reach 
unanimous agreements in the EU decision making are likely the most disappointing 
features for dictatorial Karimov. He definitely prefers having bilateral relations with the 
leaders who do not need consulting their populations in making strategic decisions and do 
not criticize lack of democracy or violations of human rights in dealing with political 
opposition and terrorism. 
4. Russia’s Influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT Policies 
The commonality of security interests and approaches between Uzbekistan and 
Russia and the increasing latter’s role in Central Asia make Russia more influential on 
the Karimov’s CT policies than any other foreign state. Although the Russian role in 
Uzbekistan significantly diminished after the USSR’s collapse, this country sustains her 
influence due to the ability to provide hard military security assistance and commonly 
repressive approach in dealing with opposition and insurgency. While the other foreign 
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powers became regional players from 1991, Russia played a major role in the region for 
centuries. Due to the above-mentioned Uzbekistan’s sensitivity for becoming dependent, 
the hegemonic Russian ambitions better materialized in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who 
remain dependent on the Russian military presence and economic cooperation. The 
cultural and historic affiliation (Chapter II. B) with Russia, significant Russian minorities, 
and activity of the Russian media, in comparison with the other foreign media,393 make 
all the Central Asian states highly susceptible to the Russian influence even after the two 
decades of their independence. The commonality of the Russian language in the region is 
one of the strongest factors towards the closer cooperation as well. The obvious 
convergence of the Central Asian strategies on Islamism with the Russian ones can be 
also explained by the theory of reference group, geographical proximity, and common 
Soviet past.394 
Despite the manipulative Karimov’s relations with the U.S. and Russia, the latter 
gets upper hand among the other foreign regional powers in Uzbekistan. Considering the 
well-known competition for international influence between the U.S. and Russia, 
Karimov exploited the relations with these countries to sustain his regime and increase 
Uzbekistan’s security. While, relying on the active U.S. appearance in the region, in 1999 
Uzbekistan withdrew from the Russian-led CIS Collective Security Treaty, during the 
deterioration of the relations with the U.S., in 2006 Uzbekistan rejoined the Russian-led 
CSTO and concluded the bilateral anti-terrorist treaty.395 Being concerned about the 
planned U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, Karimov again demonstrated the 
self-reliance by once again withdrawing from the CSTO396 but simultaneously 
approached Russia as the ally against Islamic terrorism.397 Considering the general 
reluctance of the Russian ruling elite to get too much involved in the security problems in 
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Central Asia,398 however, Uzbekistan still cannot be sure of the Russia’s committments in 
the long term. In order to appease the Russian concerns about the future U.S. military 
basing, which was discussed with the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,399 after two 
weeks Karimov declared Uzbekistan’s neutrality that “prohibits any foreign military 
bases on its territory.”400 Even if such swinging in foreign affairs may look as 
demonstration of the complete independence, it also may indicate a paranoia of the 
ageing dictator who suspects everybody and becomes unpredictable. 
The ability to provide hard military security by Russia that “seems to be the only 
power that has both the means to react to crisis and a sense of responsibility to engage”401 
makes this regional player the most valuable for Karimov and the most influential in 
Uzbekistan. Karimov avoided the Russian military help to fight Islamists in Uzbekistan 
but relied on the Russian troops in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during the IMU’s 
campaigns of 1999–2001.402 The way Russia handled insurgencies in the Caucasus also 
corresponded with the hardline Karimov’s war against Islamism. Russian military aid 
always was a significant source for developing the Uzbek security forces and “Russia is 
currently the only country supplying Tashkent with weapons.”403 The CT cooperation 
with Russia is beneficial for both sides who also utilize it in their merciless fight against 
any opposition.404 Although the Russian leadership has no intention to change the current 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies, which completely correspond with the Russian security 
interests and her own approach towards terrorism, the overall socio-economic situation in 
Uzbekistan raise concerns and official incitements for democratic reforms even from 
Russia that cannot boast about democracy herself.405 
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5. China’s Influence on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies 
Despite the abundance of capabilities of increasing influence, China’s cooperation 
with Uzbekistan is minimal. China has economic interests in Central Asian natural 
resources and the long-term political interests for friendly relations with the Muslim 
world (e.g. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), but her main geopolitical 
ambitions are focused on the Pacific, South East Asia, and Europe. The status of the 
largest Central Asian trading partner gives China plenty of opportunities to expand her 
influence in this region; however, the strategic interest in Central Asia is primarily driven 
by the domestic security issue with the separatist Uighur minorities.406 They live in the 
Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang province and constitute nine million Turkic-
speaking Muslims relating themselves to the Uighur minorities in the Central Asian 
states.407 The latter, according to Chinese security interests, have to contain the regional 
threats of Islamic terrorism and the Islamists ideas about the Caliphate of Turkestan from 
escalating and proliferating into Xinjiang province. Due to the understandable doubts 
about the actual Central Asian capabilities to do so, China accepts the hegemonic role of 
Russia and supports it through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
Considering the general Chinese reluctance to participate in multilateral 
organizations, her conservative participation in the SCO demonstrates the seriousness of 
her security concerns but also the avoidance of deeper commitments. The members of 
this organization reached an agreement on the main “goal of forging a common struggle 
against the so-called ‘three evils’ … of fundamentalism, extremism, and secessionism”408 
and held joint military exercises, such as a 2007 exercise to “[defeat] a terrorist 
organization or [reverse] a Color Revolution-style mass uprising.”409 However, the 
limited membership and absence of permanent structures and standby military units, 
indicate the minimalistic Chinese approach that is satisfied only by the common 
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understanding and framework for cooperation. The reluctance for a military involvement 
in the region was also demonstrated by the neutrality of the SCO during the political and 
ethnic crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Due to the geographical and ethnic factors, the 
cooperation with Uzbekistan is even less important to China than with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Nevertheless, Tashkent hosts the SCO’s Regional 
Antiterrorism Center Secretariat (RATS) and from 2011 adheres to the Convention of the 
SCO Cooperation against Terrorism. Due to the hardline own domestic policies and 
Uzbekistan’s role in the region, China had expressed her support of Karimov’s CT 
policies and willingness for cooperation (after the Andijan massacre in 2005)410 and had 
no intention to influence them, as far as they contain the security threats from escalating. 
6. Influence of the foreign political Islamism on Uzbekistan’s CT Policies 
The most significant developments of political Islamism in Northern Africa, 
Turkey, and Pakistan presented practical attempts to merge democracy and Islamism in 
the previously secular states and need to be analyzed in order to determine what impact 
they can have on Uzbekistan’s CT policies. The achievements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in Pakistan, and the Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) represent the full spectrum of variations, concerning their 
approach and time, in the integration of Islamism and the Western democratic principles 
despite the essential differences in the ultimate goals between the latter. Although Islamic 
constitutionalism accepts and follows the most important aspects of democracy—”the 
source and purpose of law; constraints on state power; public participation in politics; and 
protection of basic civil and political rights”411—there are two essential differences from 
the Western concept of democracy. First of all, while the latter considers state as 
suppressive institution and, therefore, limits its power in respect to the people, the Islamic 
constitutionalists give the Islamic state a task of transforming current society into an 
Islamic one by employing all available powers and imposing Islamic values and laws.412 
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Secondly, in Islamic constitutionalism “the individual is not the center of the political and 
legal universe. Rather, the focus is on building a pious community.”413 Although these 
contradictions raise doubts about the compatibility of Islamism and democracy, the 
modern Islamism in Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt show not only their feasibility but also 
encourage Islamists in other countries. 
All three cases have similar and different features that have to be considered 
before making analogies with Uzbekistan’s situation. In all three cases, Islamists 
experienced highly repressive periods and outburst of Islamic terrorism but survived and 
assumed more civilized political way. They cautiously started propagation of Islam 
within the various levels of the local societies, in-directly challenged the secular regimes 
by providing certain social services for the lowest classes, gradually developed into 
official political parties, and came into power via democratic elections by opposing 
repressive, dictatorial, and corrupt secular regimes. The popular insurgency of Egypt, 
however, is considerably less likely due the earlier–described Uzbek public support to 
their national authorities. While Pakistan’s case shares geographical proximity and to 
some extent the ethnic composition, the conflicted and repressive approach414 of the 
Pakistani Islamists seems also unacceptable to the large majority of Uzbekistan’s 
population. Finally, the still ongoing fighting between the Pakistani government and the 
Taliban demonstrate that the strong political representation of Islamists does not 
guarantee safe and secure situation in the state. The popular and official preferences in 
international relations also weaken the analogy of Egypt and Pakistan with Uzbekistan. 
The same factor, however, makes the Turkish model quite feasible. The gradual and 
cautious Islamization of the previously highly secular Turkish society415 gives additional 
support for the analogy with Uzbekistan. Furthermore, the economic European crisis and 
its reluctance to accept relatively well politically, economically, and socially performing 
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Turkey, make the Turkish model attractive to the Uzbek population whose 
disappointment in the Western democracies was presented earlier.416    
And yet, due to the hard suppressions, there is no Islamic group that would be 
ready to follow the Turkish AKP’s example in Uzbekistan. Even the favorable situation 
of the al-Qaeda and its support to the Uzbek terrorists cannot significantly increase their 
potential to emulate the Arab spring in Uzbekistan.417 The militant IMU and IJU, as it 
was discussed earlier, due to their violent philosophy and irrelevant experiences in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are not prepared to assume a role of the politically mature 
party. They cannot rely on the popular support due to their ideological and geographical 
remoteness for twenty years. The Central Asian HT is significantly superior to the 
militant groups in terms of its intellectual basis and popular perception, but it is illegal 
and cannot develop its cadres to assume official positions. Its rejection of political way 
and democracy denies any possibility to follow the examples of the above-mentioned 
Muslim countries. Considering that the MB and the other radical Islamists dropped the 
same restrictions when favorable political situation occurred, the similar change cannot 
be excluded in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, the HT in the same Northern African 
states under the same circumstances did not accepted democratic process and remained 
outside of the national politics. Nevertheless, the internal splinter in the local HT may 
produce a radical Islamic organization determined for a democratic competition but it 
would need many years to develop for such a path.    
There are some political opposition forces outside Uzbekistan but their potential 
for the promotion of Islamism is dubious. Currently only the IRPT in Tajikistan has an 
official status of political party that could potentially undertake the role of the MMA, 
AKP, or MB. However, its current situation and public support do not indicate significant 
potential to do this effectively. The more promising potential has the Uzbek opposition in 
exile. They seriously consider the recent experiences of the Arab Spring and prepare for 
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the change of the regime. Their political platform and the draft constitution418 indicate a 
much higher level of political maturity and, hence, potential in the future. Some 
discrepancies concerning the state and religion, however, can be noticed between the 
often references to Quran in these documents and the statements of the leaders. The 
opposition, led by Muhammad Salih, envisions the violent, although reluctantly, overturn 
of the Karimov’s regime, works with the Uzbek youth that tend to join the IMU or the 
IJU in order to change their radical Islamic intentions, and sees the future of Uzbekistan 
as a secular and democratic state.419 
The striking similarities of the current political, social, and economic conditions 
cannot be ignored by the Uzbek regime. Karimov understands that any acceptance of 
Islamists in the national politics will open them opportunities to grow and become such a 
force. That is why he does not accept any international influence on his anti-Islamist 
strategy, except those that can strengthen his power in Uzbekistan. Therefore, the local 
HT and the exiled Uzbek opposition are considered as the main threat and are persecuted 
with every possible measure. In order to control access to the foreign information, Uzbek 
authorities tightened control over the Internet.420 In comparison with the Egyptian, 
Turkish, and Pakistani cases, the Uzbekistan’s regime to some extent can rely on the 
Russian or even Chinese intervention, depending on the scale of crisis and its potential 
impact on the security of these regional powers.  
Despite the many parallels with the most significant developments of Islamism 
abroad during the last decade, their repetition in Uzbekistan is still unlikely. The secular 
nature of the Uzbek population, the level of repression, the immaturity of the Islamic 
opposition, and the capabilities of the current regime seem sufficient to contain the 
existing public discontent. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
The other Central Asian states had no visible influence on Uzbekistan’s CT 
policies. In contrary, the latter policies became an example for emulation in these states. 
Karimov’s regime pushed the radical Islamists into the neighboring countries and 
continued their persecution there. The other Central Asian countries which initially were 
more liberal and democratic can not containt the threat of Islamic terrorism as Uzbekistan 
does. The Uzbekistan’s incitements to follow its CT policies seem fruitful, for 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan gradually hardened their positions 
towards Islamism. During the last decade, the growing threat of the Islamism and the 
increasing regional cooperation caused the convergence of the national CT policies 
towards the more suppressive approach. Despite the similar national interests, the 
mistrust among the Central Asian leaders still hampers cooperation and needs backing by 
the foreign powers. 
The final outcome of the wider foreign influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies 
is also supportive of Karimov’s regime. Due to the lack of strategic vision for the 
regional security in Central Asia and the limited interests of the Western foreign regional 
powers there, the wider international influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies remains 
insignificant. The Western criticism on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies was not supported 
by the actual sanctions but was often compromised due to the other political and 
economic interests of these powers. Such a dubious Western stance was fully exploited 
by Russia and China to expand their influence. Although the regional strategy of China 
seems the most cohesive among the other foreign players, in conjunction with it, the 
Russian behavior in Central Asia also demonstrates a growing influence and long term 
involvement. The recent developments of the political Islam are considered by the Uzbek 
government and its opposition, but the specific conditions in this country make the 
emulation of such processes unlikely as far as the current regime is in power. 
Due to the rigidity and manipulative nature of the Karimov’s practices in foreign 
affairs and the lack of strategic vision for the whole Central Asian region among the 
foreign regional powers, the international influence on the Uzbekistan’s CT policies 
remains either insignificant, or largely supportive. Due to the converging anti-Islamist 
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strategies among the other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan maintains its ambitions for 
the regional dominance and has no need to soften the grip on Islamists. While the 
Western influence is limited due to the prevalence of economic interests, different 
philosophies, and the lack of commitment for a hard military support, the Eastern, 
especially Russian, influence becomes more acceptable to authoritarian Karimov. This 
tendency is growing stronger on the background of the planned withdrawal of the U.S.-




Despite the repressive CT policies in Uzbekistan and the extensive international 
empirical evidence about the counter-productiveness of such policies, the rather stable 
current Uzbekistan’s regime contains the threat of the Islamic terrorism and power for 
twenty years. Such an outcome, however, cannot be attributed only to the autocratic rule 
and repressive politics of President Islam Karimov. There are several factors—resources 
and organization of the state, containment of the terrorist threat, the residual Soviet 
mentality of the local population, and geopolitical situation—that all together allow the 
survival of such a repressive regime.  
The large state resources and strong centralization of power allows Uzbekistan’s 
CT policies to remain highly repressive and ignorant of human rights. The Uzbek 
government followed the most effective approach against the threat of terrorism: 
To have an impact, a strategy must be coherent, organized, and reflected 
in the state’s institutions. … In addition to building institutional support, 
leaders must also help shape public opinion to ensure popular support for 
counterterrorism in general and the strategy in particular. Political leaders 
must also give counterterrorism appropriate priority, making concessions 
on other objectives as necessary.421 
From the first encounter with the religious radicals in 1991, Karimov’s regime cracked 
down on them with a wave of arrests and persecution and expelled most of them from the 
country. Later, the terrorist attacks in 1999, 2004, 2005, and 2009 caused the new waves 
of the governmental violence and only strengthened the same approach. In parallel, the 
uncompromising policy on religion was applied to assure that the popular religion in 
Uzbekistan remains dominated by the traditionalist moderate Islam, fully controlled by 
the state, and separated from politics. The state’s resources—law enforcement, armed 
forces, governmental administration, education, government-controlled media, finance, 
and international support—in comparison to those of the terrorist and the non-violent 
Islamist organizations, are immense and highly centralized in the hierarchical structure up 
to the President. However, the official incitement for governmental violence and covert 
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compromises with the rule of law provided the national law enforcement with the 
freedom for arbitrary actions. In conjunction with the widespread corruption, such a 
governmental “mandate” developed into the unrestricted rampage by the law enforcement 
entities. The actual implementation of the CT policies, hence, made Uzbekistan 
internationally infamous for its indiscriminate use of force and harsh violations of human 
rights. As a result, disappearances of people, torture, arbitrary persecution, corrupted 
courts, victimization of innocent people, huge numbers of prisoners, and political 
refugees became persistent features of Uzbekistan. The same machine of repressions and 
governmental propaganda is also employed against any other political opposition in 
Uzbekistan. Therefore, Karimov’s regime considers such a price acceptable for the 
current containment of the Islamic terrorism. 
The timely and decisive reaction to the rise of radical Islamism in combination 
with the war in Afghanistan allowed Uzbekistan’s government to suppress the threat of 
terrorism. The latter remains contained for the last two decades. The strongest radical 
Islamist groups originated in this country in the late 1980s and quickly developed with 
the wave of Islamic revival in the country. However, they overestimated their own 
strength and openly challenged Karimov’s regime without actually mobilizing massive 
support. As a result, most of them fled to Tajikistan, later embraced ideology of global 
jihad and continued operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) represent the latter groups and fight 
against the U.S.-led coalition for survival in alliance with the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other 
jihadist organizations. Due to this fight and the increasingly harder repression of 
Karimov’s regime, the terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan from 2000 gradually decrease and 
from 2009 there is no reliable evidence about any activities of the IMU or the IJU in this 
country. Nevertheless, there are no indications that both organizations are not able or 
willing to launch new attacks in Uzbekistan in the future. This threat would significantly 
increase if the planned withdrawal of the NATO forces from 2014 would allow the 
Taliban to regain its power in Afghanistan.  
The Hizb ut-Tahrir remains the only known secret religious organization in 
Uzbekistan and claims having tens of thousands of members and followers in Central 
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Asia. Despite its non-violent approach, the propagation of the radical Islamist ideology 
indirectly induces some desperate people also for violent actions. However, this 
organization does not have any visible public presence through social support to the local 
population or any acts of resistance to the current political regime, such as done by the 
Egyptian Islamists. The state’s policy on religion also plays a major role through the total 
control of religion, uncompromising persecution of unsanctioned religious activities, 
secular education, and propagation of traditionalist Islam. Hence, the Islamist ideologies, 
both non-violent or jihadist, are not appealing to the overwhelming majority of the local 
population. On the contrary, Uzbeks reject religious and ethnic hatred, condemn 
terrorism, and favor a secular state. This makes the massive popular support to the 
Islamists, as the main factor for success of the latter in the long-term, highly unlikely in 
Uzbekistan.  
The mentality of Uzbekistan’s population allows not only repressive CT policies 
to be implemented in the country but also the autocratic Karimov’s regime to remain in 
power for twenty years. The dominance of the traditionally moderate Islam makes the 
extremist ideology of global jihad alien to the local population. In addition, the religious 
practices though the Soviet period crystalized the popular perception about the necessity 
to separate religion from the state and practice Islam without interference with the 
essentially secular lifestyle. Despite the dynamic revival of Islam from the late 1980s, 
Uzbekistan’s population still is largely secular and does not consider Islamism as a viable 
alternative to the secular regime. Hence, the repression of religious extremism and strict 
control of religion is widely considered as normal thing by the people of this country. The 
popular preferences for models of political and economic development are clearly 
oriented towards the developed countries with secular regimes. Karimov’s regime 
understands the utility of such popular preferences for the CT policies and also rests on 
them maintaining its rule in Uzbekistan. Another major element for the stability of 
Karimov’s regime is considerable natural resources. The favorable conditions of the 
international market for these resources allows Uzbekistan to some extent compensate the 
awkward economic policies, provide at least minimal social services to the population, 
and finance the entire security and defense forces, which loyalty and capabilities are 
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critical for the protection of the current regime. The historic, political, economic, social, 
ethnic, and cultural Russian influence from the Soviet period is still largely maintained 
through the contemporary relations and Russian media in particular. This is a strong 
factor keeping the residual Soviet mentality among the Uzbek population up to this day. 
Such a mentality strongly contributes to the persistent Uzbek trust in their government, 
tolerance to the violations of human and civil rights and freedoms, legitimacy of the 
governmental violence, and patience with the individual socio-economic hardship. The 
popular discontent caused by the latter, however, is gradually increasing. The ignorance 
of the public interests, inability to recognize and solve the existing problems, and 
omnipresent corruption of the government are becoming more obvious to the people and 
crystalizing into the most potential threat to the current regime. Eventually this may lead 
to the Libyan insurgency scenario. Then the currently contained Islamist terrorism could 
resurface in Uzbekistan and proliferate through the whole region.  
The fundamental prominence of the socio-economic conditions to the security and 
stability in Uzbekistan is confirmed by the corresponding situations in the other Central 
Asian states. The above-described influence of the residual Soviet mentality on the 
popular support to Islamism, perception on the governmental violence, tolerance of the 
violations of human and civil rights and freedoms, and patience with the individual 
hardship is largely present in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Due to the less 
repressive governments there, however, the popular discontent with the national 
governments is more visible and is growing faster. The role of economic conditions is 
clearly confirmed by the interrelation between the situation of national economy and 
domestic security in the country. While Kazakhstan with the strongest economy in the 
region enjoys the best security situation, Kyrgyzstan has experience of major political 
crises and Tajikistan with the weakest economy went through the civil war and from time 
to time faces armed ethnic-religious conflicts. The most democratic regime, religious 
tolerance, and inclusion of Islamists in the government from 1997 in the latter did not 
preclude these conflicts. On the contrary, the security situation in Tajikistan remains the 
worst among the other Central Asian states. Furthermore, all three states are gradually 
emulating the CT policies of Uzbekistan who at least in comparison with Tajikistan and 
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Kyrgyzstan looks much more stable and secure. The international cooperation against 
terrorism is also growing among these and other powers in the region. 
The contemporary geopolitical situation in the region contributes to the perceived 
effectiveness of Uzbekistan’s CT policies. Despite the wide international criticism on the 
harsh and indiscriminate repression, violations of human rights, and absence of 
democracy, the current geopolitical situation remains favorable for Karimov’s regime. In 
that respect, the ongoing war in Afghanistan is the most prominent international factor. 
Firstly, it keeps the IMU and the IJU unable to focus on Uzbekistan and makes 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies look effective. Secondly, it assures the high interest of the 
Western powers, especially the U.S., to maintain good relations with Karimov. Finally, it 
forces the Western powers to understand that the lasting political stability and security in 
Uzbekistan is a key factor in regional security, especially after the planned NATO’s 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Hence, the criticism on the harsh repressions and lack of 
democracy in this country is largely compromised and even turns into military and 
economic assistance.  
Western attitudes to Karimov are also related to the large natural resources and 
significant labor force and market potential of Uzbekistan. While the EU’s economic 
assistance significantly contributes to the regional cohesion and security, its incitements 
to democratize Uzbekistan are fully ignored by Karimov’s regime that respects only 
authoritarian and forceful approach. The latter preference conditioned the growing 
cooperation within the SCO, where all member states share the same regional security 
interests, favor uncompromising repression against terrorism, and can help each other 
with military and security forces. In that context, the latest rapprochement with Russia 
has the highest potential. Despite some official Russian warnings about the need to ease 
the repressive Uzbekistan’s policies to avoid the repetition of the Arab Spring scenario in 
Central Asia, Russian economic and military assistance becomes a strong factor 
supporting Karimov’s regime. In response to the international criticism, the latter 
gradually takes some modest steps towards a more democratic society and less repressive 
rule. However, the deeply rooted corruption in the highest power echelons and the 
personal reluctance of Karimov to admit own mistakes makes him incapable of essential 
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political, economic, and social improvement in Uzbekistan. So far, the whole country is a 
hostage to Karimov’s fear of losing power. 
None of these factors can be considered as the most or the least important. The 
current outcome—the continuation of the repressive CT policies and stability of the 
autocratic regime—rests on all of them more or less equally. They are strongly 
interrelated among themselves as well. The natural resources keep economy running, 
repressive forces maintained, and the current regime in power; the threat of terrorism and 
the war in Afghanistan keeps the foreign powers engaged in the region and cooperative 
with Karimov; he rests on the corrupt domestic relations, the Western tolerance, the 
Eastern cooperation, and the submissive mentality of the local population; the latter is 
disillusioned by the Western approach, supportive to the rapprochement with Russia, 
afraid of showing its discontent, and appeased by the leftovers from the corrupt 
government that exploits the national natural resources. All these relations form circular 
dependencies. That is why elimination or essential transformation of any of these factors 
can destroy the whole equilibrium. 
In that respect, there are three factors with a potential for change in the future. 
Firstly, the political stability and security situation in Afghanistan after 2014 will have 
the major influence on the regional security. The existing possibility for the Taliban’s 
return to power may give strong impulse to the revival of the radical Islamism and 
terrorism in Uzbekistan and the neighboring countries. In such a case, the repressive 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies would become counter-productive. On the other hand, such a 
scenario would be unacceptable not only to the Central Asian states but also to the 
foreign powers in the region. Hence, Uzbekistan’s government would try to “turn the 
evolving situation to their own advantage. Tashkent will start crying out that it’s on the 
front line of the war against international terrorism, and it will keep on repeating this until 
it gets the assistance it wants.” 422 Among the foreign powers, Russia and China could be 
the most active in taking preventive actions to protect Central Asia and themselves from 
such dangerous developments and contain the threat of terrorism at the tolerable level.  
                                                 
422. Pannier in interview to IWPR, October 11, 2011. 
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Secondly, despite the prevailing popular reconciliation with the current regime, 
the massive civil insurgency cannot be fully excluded. However, the radical Islamist 
ideology would be the least important motive. The relative economic deprivation, social 
decay, violation of human and civil rights and freedoms, and the lack of democracy 
would dominate the popular motivation to topple the current regime. The existing Uzbek 
political opposition, which already foresee, hope, and prepare for such an outcome,423 
would attempt to head such a movement despite the lack of resources and robust 
organization in Uzbekistan. Since the repressive CT practices were employed against any 
political opposition and public discontent, the popular grievances caused by the arbitrary 
actions and corruption of the law enforcement would definitely strengthen the popular 
determination to mobilize. Although the currently suppressed Islamic radicals and 
terrorists would also attempt to exploit any civil disturbance, their ability to head a 
massive popular movement and to gain the state power would still be very dubious. 
Thirdly—the transition of power in Uzbekistan after Karimov—may be another 
trigger to instability. It would be significantly less dependent on the foreign influence. On 
the other hand, the apparent weakness of the political opposition in exile may preclude 
the essential change in Uzbekistan’s political system. Even more the radical Islamists, 
due to their ideological and physical remoteness from the local population, would not be 
able to turn Uzbekistan into Islamic state. The well-planned and peaceful transition of the 
state power within the existing political and security elite seems more likely. The possible 
intention of the latter to relax the current repressive approach, however, remains unclear. 
It would depend on the evolution of the all above-discussed factors that currently sustain 
Karimov’s regime. 
In summary, the evaluation of the effectiveness of Uzbekistan’s CT policies has 
to be done in the context of the domestic conditions and geopolitical environment. The 
timely and uncompromising CT policies allowed the Uzbek government to contain the 
                                                 
423. Erk, Political Platform of “ERK” Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. July 4, 2007 and 
Конституция (Основной закон) республики Узбекистан (проект); Vitalyi Volkov, “Мухаммад 
САЛИХ: В Узбекистане нет ни одной ветви власти, которая бы верила в стабильность режима,” 
Новая Газета Казахстан. March 7, 2012. 
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threat of terrorism at the tolerable level. Despite the related atrocities committed by the 
current regime—not only against the terrorists, but also against pious Muslims, political 
opposition, and simply discontent and innocent people—the local population does not see 
this as a major concern or motive for insurgency. Despite the revival of Islam, majority of 
Uzbekistan’s population is rather secular and does not see political Islamism as a viable 
alternative to the secular regime. Even when the brutality of the CT and religious policies 
in Uzbekistan cannot be unconditionaly considered as the best solution against the 
Islamic terrorism, the more liberal governmental policies in the neighboring countries do 
not seem providing a remedy against it either. Moreover, the geopolitical environment 
seems to remain more favorable for a secure region than democratic and respectful of 
human rights. Using only a cold and rational calculation, it would be unfair to consider 
Uzbekistan’s CT policies as ineffective in the long-term.  
However, due to the lack of reliable data and the worsening domestic political, 
economic, and social conditions in Uzbekistan, the effectiveness of the CT policies may 
be seriously challenged. The relatively rare, largely fragmented, and mostly small in 
scope terrorist attacks in Central Asia do not provide sufficient empirical basis for 
decisive conclusions. Moreover, the current domestic and international equilibrium of 
stability and security is still vulnerable to significant changes in any of the four above-
discussed factors. In case of the Lybian-like collapse, the repressive CT policies would 
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